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INTRODUCTION
For fifty years, a familiar scene has played out in interrogation rooms across
America. Police officers read suspects the Miranda warnings.1 Suspects listen
to the warnings before either waiving or invoking their Fifth Amendment rights.2
The Miranda process remains an all-too-human drama—fraught with tension,
conflicting incentives, and potential miscommunication. Not surprisingly, after
millions of such personal interactions, familiar issues of coercion,3 constitutional
understanding,4 unambiguous invocation,5 custody,6 interrogation,7 trickery,8
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966) (holding that an individual subjected
to police interrogation must be apprised of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, of his right to an attorney, and of his right to a courtappointed attorney if he cannot afford his own).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
3 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440-45
(1987). But see Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 182-86 (1988).
4 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384-88 (2010) (explaining that an individual must
understand his rights before his waiver can be effective).
5 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994) (“[I]f a suspect makes a reference
to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal . . . our precedents do not require the cessation
of questioning.”).
6 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (holding that a child’s age properly
informs the Miranda analysis).
7 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (“‘[I]nterrogation’ under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect.” (footnote omitted)).
8 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977) (finding that a police officer lying to a
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literacy,9 competency,10 and mental illness11 have arisen out of this human
dialogue between investigators and suspects. The unsatisfying results have been
well catalogued by many of the scholars participating in this Symposium,
offering fifty years’ worth of criticism and suggestions for improvement.12
Strikingly, the core problem that gave rise to Miranda—namely, the coercive
pressure of custodial interrogation—has remained largely unchanged.13
Miranda warnings have been incorporated into the interrogation script without
notable decrease in custodial pressure.14 Miranda warnings, which were
supposed to counterbalance that human pressure, have instead become a tool
adding to that pressure.15 Further, the primary control of constitutional power—
how the warnings are given, how invocation and waiver are interpreted, and
whether the warnings are understood—remains with the interrogating officers.16

suspect about finding his fingerprints at the scene was irrelevant to the determination of
whether the suspect was “in custody”); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding
admissible a confession given after the police lied about a codefendant confessing);
Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR.
L. REV. 775, 775-77 (1997) (discussing the “murk[y] morality” of police lying to suspects to
gather evidence); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28
CONN. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (1996) (“Police lie about facts in interrogations in pursuit of
varied, and sometimes conflicting, objectives.”).
9 See Pamela M. Henry-Mays, Farewell Michael C., Hello Gault: Considering the Miranda
Rights of Learning Disabled Children, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 343, 350-53 (2007) (recounting
situations in which defendants with the reading ability of elementary school children waived
their Miranda rights after reading them).
10 Bruce Frumkin, Competency to Waive Miranda Rights: Clinical and Legal Issues, 24
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 326, 326 (2000) (“A defendant may make a
knowing waiver, but not an intelligent one. For example, a defendant who understands the
right to be represented by a lawyer, but erroneously believes that an attorney only defends
innocent people cannot intelligently waive this right.”).
11 See, e.g., Virginia G. Cooper & Patricia A. Zapf, Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension
of Miranda Rights, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 390, 392 (2008) (investigating psychiatric
patients’ understanding of the Miranda warnings).
12 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849
(2017); Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1293 (2017);
Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty
Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV.
1157 (2017).
13 Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miranda: Concessions for Confessions, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 905, 924 (2016) (“Almost everyone who accepts the Miranda Court’s view that
custodial police interrogation generally jeopardizes free and rational choice would agree that
Miranda doctrine has failed to remedy that concern adequately.”).
14 Id. at 933.
15 Id. at 925.
16 Id. at 940.
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With limited exception, the Miranda colloquy remains not appreciably different
today than it was fifty years ago.17
This Article proposes bringing Miranda into the twenty-first century by
developing a “Miranda App” to replace the existing, human Miranda warnings
and waiver process with a digital, scripted computer program of videos, text, and
comprehension assessments. Accessible on a smartphone, computer, tablet,
iPad, or other system, the Miranda App would provide constitutionally adequate
warnings, clarifying answers, contextual information, and age-appropriate
instruction to suspects before interrogation. Designed by legal scholars,
validated by social science experts, and tested by police, the Miranda App would
address fifty years’ worth of unsatisfactory Miranda process.18 Each of
Miranda’s core warnings would be communicated via interactive digital
graphics, animation, video, and text.19 Explanations would accompany each
word and legal concept.20 Short comprehension tests would be built into the
system to evaluate a suspect’s general understanding of language and law.21
Additional clarification would be available to address confusion about
terminology, process, or rights.22 In addition, as designed, the Miranda App
could generate a contemporaneous record of useful data about the suspect’s
current capacity, literacy, understanding, and familiarity with constitutional
rights.23 The App would be free, simple to use, easy to understand, and would
provide the clarity and finality lacking in current Miranda practice. After
custody, a police officer would simply hand over the Miranda App to the suspect
and hand off the responsibility to explain or advise suspects to the machine.
The goal is not simply to invent a better process for informing suspects of
their Miranda rights, but to use the design process itself to study what has failed
in past practice. This Article includes not only the blueprints for Miranda’s
future, but also a rendering of the structural weakness of past doctrine.
The Miranda App is both metaphor and machine. As metaphor, thinking
through how one might offer Miranda warnings anew—without the mediation
of an interrogating detective—requires resolving many elided or assumed
questions at the heart of Miranda. How much do we want suspects to know about
their rights, or about the larger adversarial context of investigation, or about the
consequences of invocation or waiver? In Berghuis v. Thompkins,24 the Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of a suspect “understanding” Miranda as a

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 943.
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.D.1.
See infra Section II.D.2.
See infra Section II.F.1.
See infra Section II.D.2.
See infra Section II.F.
560 U.S. 370 (2010).
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prerequisite of waiver,25 but the Miranda process has not evolved to address or
ensure that requirement of understanding.26 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
demanded that defendants master a new level of precision for invoking rights.
Suspects must now “unambiguously” invoke their right to silence or counsel,27
yet the Miranda colloquy has not changed to clarify this more exacting
requirement. As metaphor, the Miranda App allows a reexamination of each of
these doctrinal choices developed piecemeal in the case law. The design process
necessarily entails a questioning of what information should be provided to
fulfill constitutional requirements as well as how to best convey information to
a wide variety of potential suspects.
As machine, the Miranda App could become a useful replacement for current
Miranda practice. Educational software has become commonplace,28 and the
development of such a computer program to teach, test, and evaluate Miranda
would be relatively simple to create. Once designed, a Miranda App could
provide a standardized yet customizable constitutional process for providing
Miranda to all suspects. Once developed and tested, the Miranda App could
offer police officers an easy method to complete Miranda’s requirements in a
way that would be relatively immune from legal challenge.29 Miranda warnings
and waiver could become as routine as the many other computer interfaces
citizens regularly must navigate in a digital world.
Part I of this Article looks back on Miranda fifty years later to ask whether
the central goal of Miranda—counterbalancing the coercive effects of custodial
interrogation—has been achieved. In arguing that Miranda has largely failed,
this Part revisits some of the problems in doctrine and practice that have
undermined its promise.
Part II sets out the prototype design for the Miranda App. This Part details
the design components, including what instructions would be given to users, the
language of Miranda, how clarifying information would be provided, and
mechanisms for human assistance. This Part also describes the design

25

Id. at 384.
See Howe, supra note 13, at 908 (“[T]he Miranda Court itself mandated only a
confusing and misleading warning that was of no help to suspects in understanding the
consequences of their choices.”).
27
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994).
28 Marcia Clemmitt, Digital Education: Can Technology Replace Classroom Teachers?,
21 CQ RESEARCHER 1001, 1001 (2011).
29 Our proposed Miranda App will face legal challenges. But, once developed, tested, and
accepted as an improved practice, such challenges will be easier to defeat. Currently, officers
must defend their individual practice against a rather standardless backdrop of appropriate
behavior. See Howe, supra note 13, at 940-41. Each confession can be litigated because each
Miranda colloquy is different. But, with a Miranda App, once the initial challenges have been
overcome successfully, each additional use of the system will not require challenge as it will
present a uniform approach to handling Miranda warnings and waiver. Once accepted, the
litigation costs will be reduced.
26

940

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:935

mechanisms that would allow for the collection of data about the competency,
literacy, and mental health about particular suspects in individual cases, as well
as the collection of national data about Miranda practices more broadly.
Part III argues that many of the problems identified in Part I can be solved by
designing and adopting the Miranda App. The Miranda App offers five
significant improvements over the existing human process of informing suspects
of their rights. The Miranda App has the potential to reduce custodial pressure,
rebalance constitutional power, ensure legal understanding, provide clear
guidelines, and create a valuable dataset about Miranda practices. The
arguments in this Part seek to offer both a technological and theoretical design
for an improved Miranda process.
Part IV briefly addresses some of the concerns with the proposed Miranda
App design. These concerns involve the traditional critique that any
improvement of Miranda will increase invocation and decrease confessions, as
well as some more modern issues involving technological literacy, system
validation, and cybersecurity.
The modest goal of this Symposium Article reflecting on Miranda’s first fifty
years is to use the design process of the Miranda App to rethink the Miranda
warnings and waiver process. As metaphor, the Miranda App offers an
opportunity to examine the strengths and weaknesses of existing practice. As a
technical blueprint, the Miranda App offers a schematic for software designers
to actually develop a better system to inform suspects of their constitutional
rights.
I.

MIRANDA: AFTER FIFTY YEARS

As just about anyone who has watched television knows, Miranda requires
that, before custodial questioning can begin, police warn a suspect of his rights
to silence and publicly appointed counsel and that anything he says may be later
used against him.30 Though Miranda is presumed to contain one holding,
Stephen Schulhofer has argued that it actually contains at least three separate
conceptual steps or holdings that are necessary to understand its doctrinal
structure.31 First, the Supreme Court held that compulsion within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies not only in
formal settings, such as at trial, but also in informal settings, such as in-custody
police interrogation, which are inherently compulsive.32 Second, the Court held
that unless adequate alternative protective devices are established to protect a
suspect from these inherently compelling pressures, police are required to warn
a suspect prior to interrogation of his rights to silence and appointed counsel,

30 Ronald Steiner, Rebecca Bauer & Rohit Talwar, The Rise and Fall of the Miranda
Warnings in Popular Culture, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 220-21 (2011).
31 Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 436.
32 Id. at 436-40.
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and that anything he says may be used against him in court.33 Finally, the Court
held that statements obtained during custodial interrogation will only be
admissible if a suspect has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
these Fifth Amendment rights.34 The purpose of the constitutionally required
Miranda warning and waiver regime was to dispel the inherent compulsion of
custodial interrogation and thereby protect a suspect’s informed choice about
whether to freely participate in police questioning, and thus prevent involuntary
statements.35
As Charles Weisselberg has pointed out, the Warren Court made several
assumptions about what was necessary for the Miranda warnings to achieve this
goal.36 First, the Court assumed that “‘custody’ would distinguish interrogations
that contain compelling pressures from those that do not.”37 The Court thus only
required Miranda warnings when an interrogated suspect was in custody (i.e.,
when the suspect is either under arrest or “otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way”).38 Second, the Court assumed that police
detectives would provide warnings and elicit waivers before employing any
interrogation techniques.39 The Court emphasized that the warnings and waiver
must precede any custodial interrogation.40 Third, the Court assumed that
suspects would be able to understand their rights and thus be able to freely and
rationally choose whether to speak or remain silent.41 In order to be valid, the
Miranda Court required that a suspect’s waiver be knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently given.42 Finally, the Court assumed police interrogators “would not
begin questioning unless suspects clearly and affirmatively waived their rights,
and questioning would cease if suspects who initially waived their rights later
indicated that they wished to invoke them.”43 In other words, interrogation could
not proceed in the absence of an affirmative waiver or in the presence of an
affirmative invocation. The Miranda decision thus placed a “heavy burden” on
the prosecution to establish that the suspect’s waiver had been properly
obtained.44

33

Id. at 440-53.
Id. at 453-55.
35 Id. at 445.
36 Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1527-29 (2008).
37 Id. at 1527 (emphasis omitted).
38 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
39 Id. at 476 (“[T]he fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before
a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights.”).
40 Id. at 444.
41 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1528.
42 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
43 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1529 (emphasis omitted).
44 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
34
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The Miranda Court drew on contemporary police training manuals to present
a picture of psychologically oriented interrogation that was inherently coercive
and thus undermined the ability of the suspect to make an informed and
unfettered choice about whether to participate in custodial questioning or to give
a voluntary statement.45 The Court decried the secrecy of incommunicado police
interrogation and its effects, calling it “at odds with one of our Nation’s most
cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate
himself.”46 And the Court viewed the use of warnings and waivers as necessary
to constitutionally regulate the admissibility of statements elicited during
custodial interrogation.47
In the fifty years since Miranda was decided, numerous scholars have
empirically studied the effects of Miranda on the ground, demonstrating that
Miranda warnings have devolved into a largely meaningless ritual, and thus
become grossly ineffective as a means to protect basic rights.48 Three police
practices relating to Miranda’s presentation have similarly minimized the
warnings’ effectiveness. The first can best be described as “softening up” a
suspect. By starting with relatively innocuous questions and putting the suspect
at ease, law enforcement agents commence a pattern of questioning (by police)
and answering (by suspects) that becomes challenging for suspects to break
when the questions grow increasingly serious and related to the incident at
hand.49 By the time Miranda warnings are finally given, a rapport has often been
established that encourages suspects to talk.50 Even when a rapport is not
established, some suspects become so used to the pattern of question and
response that they continue to cooperate out of habit.
The second tactic involves deemphasizing the warnings’ importance.51 By
framing the warnings as an irrelevant bureaucratic procedure, police are able to

45

Id. at 447-55.
Id. at 457-58.
47 Id. at 473.
48 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First
Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1021 (2001) (“If the goal of Miranda was to reduce the
kinds of interrogation techniques and custodial pressures that create stationhouse compulsion
and coercion, then it appears to have failed miserably: The reading of rights and the taking of
waivers has become, seemingly, an empty ritual, and American police continue to use the
same psychological methods of persuasion, manipulation, and deception that the Warren
Court roundly criticized in Miranda.” (footnote omitted)); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading
Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 669
(2006) (“In short, Miranda is effectively dead, and only its ghost remains in the empty ritual
played out in interrogation rooms across the country.”).
49 Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,
661 (1996).
50 Id. at 661-62.
51 Id. at 662-63.
46
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increase the likelihood that suspects will waive their rights, not recognizing the
import of their actions.52 In this way, the “time out” that the Supreme Court
envisioned Miranda providing—a space in which suspects could rationally
decide whether to invoke their rights—becomes not a time out at all, but a
moment that simply blurs into the background.53
The third tactic is to suggest to suspects that providing information to police
could lead to the suspect’s case being viewed more favorably, or even more
leniently, in court.54 David Simon, Richard Leo, and Welsh White have
documented numerous instances of this technique in the interrogations of
adults.55 Barry Feld has observed this tactic used with particular effectiveness
upon juvenile suspects.56 A related maneuver is to imply that a suspect’s
relationship with police is non-adversarial, that the police are neutral fact-finders
who can help him, and that opening up to these powerful “friends” is the only
way to improve his situation.57 Drawing on these studies, Yale Kamisar has
suggested that police interrogators are not so much adapting to Miranda as
circumventing, evading, and disregarding it:
According to Simon, Leo and White, in a significant number of instances,
what the police are doing in effect is explaining to the suspect (or
persuading him) why it is in his best interest to talk to them and why it will

52

Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433
(1999) (“In order to de-emphasize the significance of the Miranda warnings, the interrogator
then portrays the reading of the warnings as an unimportant bureaucratic ritual and
communicates, implicitly or explicitly, that he anticipates that the suspect will waive his rights
and make a statement.”).
53 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1562.
54 Leo & White, supra note 52, at 440-47 (“Interrogators may seek to persuade a suspect
that waiving his Miranda rights will be in his best interest and will result in tangible or
intangible benefits.”); Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1558 (“[O]fficers may suggest that a
person would be viewed more favorably (and thus, implicitly, receive more lenient
punishment) if she speaks with investigators.”).
55 E.g., DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 203 (Owl Books 2006)
(1991) (documenting an investigator saying “[n]ow’s the time to speak up, right now when I
got my pen and paper here on the table, because once I walk out of this room any chance you
have of telling your side of the story is gone and I gotta write it up the way it looks”); Leo &
White, supra note 52, at 440 (“[The interrogator] may state that she can only portray the
suspect’s account in its most favorable light to the prosecutor if the suspect waives his
rights.”); Leo, supra note 49, at 662 (describing an instance in which an officer points out
“that what the suspect tells him may help him out and thus may or may not be used against
him”).
56 BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGATION ROOM 80
(2013).
57 Id. at 76-79; RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 122
(2008).
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be so much the worse for him if he decides not to do so. I do not think it an
exaggeration to say that in a significant number of cases, the police, in
effect, are talking the suspect out of asserting his rights before the “waiver
of rights” transaction ever takes place.58
The ability of suspects to comprehend their rights, once presented with
warnings, has also been the subject of much empirical and theoretical
investigation. Largely unanticipated by the Supreme Court in the 1960s, the
difficulty that many suspects have understanding their rights has played a major
role in limiting Miranda’s effectiveness.59 The inability to understand has been
driven by two factors. First, Miranda warnings are phrased differently in various
jurisdictions—some phrasings are easier to comprehend or more likely to elicit
a knowing waiver than others.60 The second factor focuses not on the
characteristics of the warnings, but on the characteristics of suspects. Suspects
with limited education, juveniles, non-English-speaking populations, and the
intellectually disabled have all been found to face particular difficulties
understanding their rights.61
The standard for an effective waiver is that it be made “knowingly and
intelligently”62 as well as voluntarily.63 Voluntariness is assessed by looking into
whether suspects have made a “free and deliberate choice” to waive their rights,
and determining whether that choice was free of coercion.64 Thomas Grisso,65
Solomon Fulero and Caroline Everington,66 and Richard Rogers67 are among

58 Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It,
How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 187 (2007). As the
Warren Court in Miranda indicated, “any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked,
or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his
privilege.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
59 See Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1563-67.
60 See id. at 1565.
61 GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE
TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND 196-207 (2012).
62 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
63 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1563.
64 Id.
65 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1166 (1980) (“[Y]ounger juveniles as a class do not understand the
nature and significance of their Miranda rights to remain silent and to counsel.”).
66 Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Mental Retardation, Competency to Waive
Miranda Rights, and False Confessions, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND
ENTRAPMENT 163, 163-79 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (“Persons with mental retardation
are susceptible to non-physical forms of coercion, pressure and intimidation by the police that
people with normal intelligence can more readily withstand.”).
67 See Richard Rogers et al., “Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit
Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 300, 315 (2010)
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those who have participated in a groundswell of research into the ability of
suspects to understand Miranda warnings such that an informed choice can
occur. For example, Rogers and his colleagues have reported on the general
understandability of the warnings.68 Using the Flesch-Kincaid measurement of
grade equivalent reading ability, they discovered that an eighth-grade reading
ability, on average, is needed to understand the right to counsel, while a tenthgrade reading ability is needed to understand the right to appointment of
counsel.69 Because criminal defendants are often less educated than the general
population,70 this relatively high reading requirement can have a startling impact
on the ground.
Those suspects who are intellectually disabled,71 borderline intellectually
disabled,72 psychiatric inpatients,73 juveniles,74 or non-native English speakers75
are especially at risk. For example, Virginia Cooper and Patricia Zapf found that
approximately 60% of seventy-five psychiatric inpatients they tested were

[hereinafter Rogers et al., Everyone Knows] (finding “widespread misassumptions and
misinformation about Miranda rights and waivers”); Richard Rogers et al., General
Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda Rights: Are Effective Miranda Advisements Still
Necessary?, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 432, 434 (2013) [hereinafter Rogers et al., General
Knowledge] (“A central question is whether members of the American public possess a
working knowledge of their Miranda rights.”).
68 Rogers et al., Everyone Knows, supra note 67, at 307 (“Although the right to counsel
may seem self-explanatory, many defendants have limited understanding of the precision
required to invoke this right and its concomitant advantages.”).
69 Id.
70 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1569.
71 Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 590 (2002).
72 Id.
73 Cooper & Zapf, supra note 11, at 402 (“[T]here was . . . significant impairment in that
three-fifths of our sample of psychiatric adults failed to understand at least one Miranda
right.”).
74 Grisso, supra note 65, at 1166 (“[T]he comprehension of these rights by younger
juveniles is so deficient as to mandate a per se exclusion of waivers made without legal
counsel by these juveniles.”); Jodi L. Viljoen, Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Adjudicative
Competence and Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adolescent Defendants: A Comparison
of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. SCI. L. 1, 17 (2007) (“The application of adult standards to
youth may lead to extremely high rates of youth . . . being classified as impaired or
incompetent.”).
75 Floralynn Einesman, Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and
Diversity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 47 (1999) (“[T]he suspect’s cultural heritage and
language abilities affect every facet of Miranda.”); Richard Rogers et al., The Language of
Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 125-26 (2008) (discussing the effect of sentence complexity on
understanding Miranda warnings).

946

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:935

unable to understand even one Miranda right.76 Morgan Cloud and his
colleagues’ findings were similarly disturbing: the disabled subjects understood
only 20% of the words that make up the Miranda warning77 and comprehended
the right to remain silent only 22% of the time.78 The right to consult with an
attorney and the warning that anything said could be held against them was
understood only 31% of the time.79
As for juveniles, most individuals fifteen and younger tested by Grisso failed
to understand at least one warning.80 In another study, Jodi Viljoen and his
colleagues reported that 78% of eleven to thirteen year olds and 62.7% of
fourteen to fifteen year olds were impaired with respect to understanding their
rights when compared with adults.81 Miranda warnings that have been rephrased
to increase youth comprehension may, ironically, be even less accessible than
the standard warnings.82 And once juveniles do talk, they are especially at risk
of offering false confessions. In a study of 340 wrongful convictions, 42% of
juveniles provided false confessions, as compared with 13% of adults.83
The warnings are similarly inaccessible to non-English speakers. For
example, while Spanish language warnings are generally easier to comprehend
than those in English, they also tend to convey less information, incorporate
errors, or omit information.84 Some errors are so egregious as to exclude entire
rights, such as the right to counsel or silence.85 Additionally, once non-English
speakers do waive their rights, they are—like juveniles—especially at risk of
falsely confessing.86 This is due, in part, to the inflated power differential
76

Cooper & Zapf, supra note 11, at 400.
Cloud et al., supra note 71, at 539.
78 Id. at 545.
79 Id. at 548-50.
80 Grisso, supra note 65, at 1160.
81 Viljoen, Zapf & Roesch, supra note 74, at 9.
82 Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda
Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 63, 84 (2008) (noting that additional explanatory
details “result in significantly longer warnings that place increased demands on juveniles’
comprehension”); Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1573.
83 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545 (2005). As of February 16, 2017, The National Registry
of Exonerations lists 2015 exonerations in the United States since 1989. NAT’L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-theUnited-States-Map.aspx [https://perma.cc/X3GK-BSLT] (last updated Apr. 13, 2017).
84 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1573-74.
85 Richard Rogers et al., Spanish Translations of Miranda Warnings and the Totality of the
Circumstances, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 61, 64 (2009).
86 See SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, COERCED CONFESSIONS: THE DISCOURSE OF BILINGUAL
POLICE INTERROGATIONS 106-07 (Richard J. Watts ed., 2009) (explaining how viewing
Miranda warnings through the lens of another culture can greatly affect a suspect’s
understanding of her rights).
77
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underlying interrogations where the suspect does not speak English and the
interrogator does.87
The rights Miranda safeguards have been further jeopardized by courts’
increasing recognition of implicit waivers.88 While investigators once had the
burden to establish suspects had explicitly waived their rights before statements
could be admitted into evidence, that burden has shifted.89 Today, something as
simple as answering investigators’ questions following Miranda warnings can
be interpreted by courts as an implied waiver.90 Further, the original practice of
asking suspects whether they “understand” their rights or whether they are
willing to talk after hearing the warnings has largely fallen to the wayside.91
Often, rights are read and then questioning simply ensues, blurring into each
other, leaving little room for either an invocation or an explicit waiver.92
Even as the ability for investigators to establish a waiver has become easier,
the ability to assert one’s rights has become more difficult. For example, in
Davis v. United States,93 the Supreme Court found the statement “maybe I
should talk to a lawyer” too uncertain to obligate the police to stop questioning
a suspect.94 Charles Weisselberg has stressed that Davis, in combination with
the implied waiver doctrine, has essentially remade both Miranda’s standard and
burden of proof.95 As he explains, “we no longer require a suspect’s clear
articulation of waiver as the ‘green light’ that permits interrogation to go
forward. Rather we require a suspect’s clear and firm articulation of invocation
as the ‘red light’ to stop it.”96 In case there was any doubt remaining, this
inversion was confirmed by the Court in Thompkins, in which the Supreme
Court declared that not speaking is not enough to assert one’s right to silence;
instead, the invocation must be explicit.97
Once the Miranda rights are waived (implicitly or explicitly)—and studies
show that 78 to 96% of suspects do in fact waive98—Miranda typically plays no

87

Id. at 108.
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010); North Carolina v. Butler, 441
U.S. 369, 373-76 (1979).
89 See Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 383-84.
90 Leo, supra note 48, at 1017-18.
91 Id.; Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1588.
92
LEO, supra note 57, at 37 (“[D]etectives typically minimize and blow past the warnings
in a moment.”).
93 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
94 Id. at 455-62 (“[W]e are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police
questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer.”).
95 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1588-89.
96 Id. at 1589.
97 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010).
98 Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in THE MIRANDA
DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 271, 275 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III
88
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role in mitigating the process or outcome of the subsequent interrogation.99 Any
protection Miranda might have offered a suspect usually evaporates as soon as
the rights are waived and the accusatory interrogation begins—which is exactly
when a suspect is mostly likely to feel the inherently compelling pressures of
police-dominated custodial questioning.100 As William Stuntz noted, “[a]lmost
no one invokes his Miranda rights once questioning has begun.”101
In short, empirical studies of Miranda’s impact on the ground have
demonstrated that the underlying assumptions necessary for Miranda to
successfully achieve its stated goals simply have not been met in practice.102
Custody is no longer a marker for whether interrogation contains compelling
pressures: police often circumvent, evade and disregard Miranda’s clear
commands by providing warnings only after interrogation has begun; many
suspects do not comprehend the warnings; and waivers are assumed from the
reading of the warnings themselves rather than from any evidence or
documentation that they were knowingly or voluntarily given.103
On its own terms, Miranda has largely failed “to afford custodial suspects an
informed and unfettered choice between speech and silence and, at the same
time, prevent involuntary statements.”104 Instead, it has become a pale shell of
its former self. Psychological police tactics since Miranda seems to go on more
or less as they did before Miranda, and so the inherently compelling pressures
remain, sometimes made worse by the fact that the voluntariness of the waiver
is treated by many trial courts as a proxy for the voluntariness of the confession
itself.105 As Kamisar foresaw one year before the Miranda decision, the original
Miranda may have been destined to fail because the Warren Court delegated the
function of giving the Miranda warnings to the very group who would be most
inclined to undermine its potential effect.106 In addition, Miranda did not and
could not change the adversarial nature of American police interrogation. By the
time police detectives reach the interrogation stage, they are no longer neutral
investigators or mere fact-finders, but rather have become partisans whose goal
is to build a case against the accused by eliciting and constructing incriminating
statements in order to help the state achieve a successful prosecution.107

eds., 1998); see also THOMAS & LEO, supra note 61, at 9.
99 WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 118-19 (2001).
100 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
101 William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001).
102 Leo, supra note 48, at 1005.
103 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1543-64.
104 Id. at 1521.
105 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
106 Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to . . ., in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME
3, 35-36 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).
107 LEO, supra note 57, at 6; Feld, supra note 56, at 20.
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Utilizing a computer program to give Miranda warnings and take Miranda
waivers would remove the investigative bias that police interrogators introduce
into the pre-interrogation process. We believe that a Miranda App may thus be
able overcome many of the problems that have undermined the promise of
Miranda and have caused the Miranda warnings to fail in practice. At the very
least, a Miranda App offers a better system to inform suspects of their
constitutional rights and to afford them a more complete and contextualized
choice about what is about to follow before they consent to potentially coercive
and life-altering police interrogation. It is to this discussion that we now turn.
II.

THE MIRANDA APP

As both metaphor and design blueprint, the Miranda App allows a reflection
on how to improve the Miranda warnings and waiver process. This Part
describes the technical, practical, and theoretical vision of a Miranda App.
After a brief discussion of design elements, this Part examines the Miranda
process from the perspective of how a suspect might interact with the Miranda
App at the outset of a custodial interrogation. First, we examine what
information needs to be provided to orient a suspect about why they are being
handed this electronic device and computer program. Second, we examine what
information needs to be given to suspects about why Miranda warnings are
given at all. Third, we examine how the actual Miranda warnings would be
given and how to clarify and improve the delivery of information. Fourth, we
examine how the waiver and invocation process should be explained and
memorialized. Finally, we offer a few suggestions to test Miranda
comprehension. This framework allows us to detail a vision of what a Miranda
App might look like, and just as importantly, to expose some of the hidden
assumptions in current Miranda practice that undermine comprehension and
contextual understanding of Fifth Amendment rights.
A. Brief Comment on Design
Software design involves both art and science.108 The Miranda App, like all
educational apps, involves the creation of a structured learning environment to
achieve certain comprehension or learning outcomes.109 Computer scientists,
given the appropriate informational inputs, and told to focus on particular
educational outputs, can design an interactive program to guide users through an
established step-by-step learning process. The task at issue with a Miranda App
involves providing substantive and procedural information to a user to ensure
constitutional understanding.
The challenge for law professors writing a law review article is to set forth
the legal requirements of such an App, leaving open design choices for software

108 Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L.
REV. 563, 625.
109 See Clemmitt, supra note 28, at 1004-08, 1010-12.
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developers. As such, we take no particular position on how a Miranda App
should be designed. But, to understand how we visualize the Miranda App
working, we offer several basic design suggestions.
First, using the technology available today, we envision the Miranda App
working on a computer, tablet, iPad, or even a smartphone. The App could be
launched with a click of a button, and there would be no other mediation between
the user and the digital interface. All information would be saved on the device
and uploaded into a secure server.110 An alternative could be a web-app, hosted
on a single URL and accessible to anyone with online connectivity. A video feed
would record the suspect as she interacted with the App.111 As a result, the device
would capture a complete video of the suspect’s face as she worked through the
App.112 In addition, the device would collect audio of the suspect’s interaction
with the Miranda App.
Second, all of the Miranda-related information must be presented in formats
for both visual and auditory learners, and designed consistent with established
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines.113 Some suspects may not be able to
110 Data security will be a serious consideration in the creation of a Miranda App. Secure
data storage of digital video can be expensive. These issues are already being confronted in
the debate over police-worn body cameras. Lucas Mearian, As Police Move to Adopt Body
Cams, Storage Costs Set to Skyrocket, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 3, 2015, 2:45 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2979627/cloud-storage/as-police-move-to-adoptbody-cams-storage-costs-set-to-skyrocket.html [https://perma.cc/QXC4-QNEW] (“[W]ith
the increasing use of body cameras . . . the amount of video content now being generated is
far more difficult to manage locally.”). Open questions remain about types of encryption
needed, whether the data would need to be secured from police officers involved in the case
as well as individuals trying to interfere with the criminal justice system, and what the data
retention processes and procedures would be.
111 See generally Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History:
The Need for Mandatory Recordings of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the
Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 639-40 (2004)
(explaining that, through legislation and resolutions, several states and the American Bar
Association are calling for police to record interrogation); Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic
Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1127, 1127-28 (2005) (discussing the ways recorded interrogations benefit suspects, law
enforcement, and courts).
112 A warning alerting the suspect to this recording will be necessary in the design.
Suspects will need to be informed that they are being recorded on video, and offered an ability
to opt out of the entire Miranda App process. In addition, suspects will need to be informed
that their data will be collected as part of the Miranda App process, with appropriate
disclaimers for official use and possible deanonymized scientific research.
113 See M.H. Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 139, 151-56 (2001) (discussing different learning styles of law students);
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Overview, WEB ACCESSIBILITY INITIATIVE,
www.w3.org/WAI/intro/wcag.php [https://perma.cc/4469-RWB9] (last updated Mar. 10,
2017) (describing WCAG 2.0 which emphasizes the technical standards to improve web
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read, but can comprehend verbal instructions. Other suspects may only learn by
seeing and studying the words themselves. In addition, because the medium of
an App allows for digital innovation, we envision video, graphics, and
animations adding explanatory power to the design. Written descriptions of legal
terms could be accompanied by visual explanations through images, graphics,
animations, or hyperlinks. Videos of real people, avatars, or a combination of
the two could be used to capture the attention of viewers. A narrator (available
in multiple languages) would guide users through the process of understanding
Miranda warnings and obtaining a valid waiver or acknowledging the
invocation of rights. Over time, the App would need to be developed for
translation in multiple languages.
Third, all descriptions and lessons must be communicated in a slow, clear,
and repetitive manner. Because electronically mediated instruction can be
intimidating to some, and too much information to process for others, a
mechanism for review and repetition must be built into the process. A playback
mechanism akin to a digital video recording device will allow the suspect to
rewind and replay the tape. Design choices must be made to remedy the limited
educational backgrounds and legal experience of some suspects. Layout and
information should be simple, spare, basic, and clear. Systems to double check
comprehension, mechanisms to portray the same information in different
formats, and literal repetition will enhance learning.
Fourth, word choices, images, and other design choices must be culturally
sensitive, so that suspects will not be insulted or distanced from the relevance to
their lives. Such sensitivity would necessitate creating the App for different
languages and perhaps even different ages or geographic regions. One could
even offer individuals a choice of programs that might be more culturally
relevant to their particular circumstance.114
Finally, the Miranda App must reinforce the gravity of the information
provided. The way the App conveys the information must reflect the significance
of the constitutional lessons being imparted, and the tone of the App must match
the seriousness of the constitutional moment. The App should be viewed not as
a game, but more like a test.
B. Initial Instructions—Establishing Context
The Miranda warnings only make sense in context. Miranda requires a
suspect be informed of particular rights relevant for the particular experience of
custodial interrogation.115 Developers of a Miranda App must account for the
importance of accurately establishing the context of what is happening to the
suspect now, and what is going to happen to the suspect in the future.
content accessibility).
114 A suspect might choose an “avatar” which would make him or her feel most
comfortable.
115 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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1. Explaining Why a Miranda App Is Being Used: Context and Process
In a traditional interrogation, a detective offers some prologue before giving
the Miranda warnings.116 This introduction might be as formulaic as, “before we
speak, I need to inform you of your rights,” or might include a lengthy build-up
that in practice serves to minimize the importance of Miranda warnings in the
context of the extended interrogation.117 This police-directed prologue could be
replaced by handing over an electronic device with the Miranda App. As such,
the Miranda App must orient the suspect to why they have been handed this
electronic device and what is going to happen next.
From a suspect’s perspective, the Miranda App must first explain why it has
been provided. This can be done with a quick initial video introduction or
animation. This initial introduction would provide context about the relevance
and importance of the Miranda process. First, the Miranda App must explain
why any instruction about constitutional rights is being provided at this
moment.118 Second, the Miranda App must explain how this moment fits within
the police-dominated context of a criminal investigation and possible criminal
prosecution.119 Simply stated, the initial introduction answers the question of
“what is going on?”
The introduction also must signal a seriousness of what is about to take place.
In the ordinary booking process, many routine, relatively unimportant tasks must
be accomplished. A booking officer may ask routine booking questions (to
gather biographical information),120 another officer may collect biometric
information (fingerprints, DNA),121 another might take a booking photograph
(mug shot),122 and another might be there to inquire about personal needs
(food/bathroom necessities). Handing over a Miranda App could be seen as yet
another routine booking task, as opposed to a significant constitutional moment.
The Miranda App must inform a suspect about the significance of the upcoming
warnings. Further, it might have to do so without the custodial setting envisioned
by Miranda. The Miranda App could be provided before entering the
interrogation room and so must explain the upcoming custodial experience.
In thinking through informational design, the first question to be answered is
“what background information does a suspect need to know about the Miranda
116

Leo & White, supra note 52, at 433.
See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
118 After all, a suspect may not understand why a computer is being handed over without
this introduction.
119 The App would try to explain, in a big picture sort of way, what is happening and is
going to happen. Assuming that police have no role at this point, such explanation might be
necessary for someone with no familiarity with the legal system.
120 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 584, 590-91, 601-02 (1990) (finding that “routine
booking question[s]” are not within the purview of Miranda protections).
121 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013).
122 Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1567-70 (2012).
117
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process?” A host of big issues could be introduced. Do you need to explain the
Constitution’s role in regulating criminal procedure?123 Do you need to explain
the Supreme Court’s constitutionalizing of the Miranda script?124 Do you need
to explain the larger adversarial process of criminal justice?125 Do you simply
need to explain the fact that Miranda rights exist? These questions—rarely
examined—are embedded in any Miranda recitation. After all, when a detective
says something to the effect of “the Supreme Court has required I read you your
Miranda rights before we speak,” this statement presumes knowledge of basic
concepts like “what is the Supreme Court?” or “what is Miranda?” or “what are
rights?”126 Choosing how to clearly convey the existence, importance, and
relevance of constitutional rights in this particular police setting, and how the
App will help with this understanding, is the initial challenge of any Miranda
App introduction.
Relatedly, the Miranda App must explain these constitutional rights in the
context of the adversarial process.127 By removing the detective from the
recitation of the warnings, a symbol of adversarial conflict is also removed. Yet,
the adversarial posture remains. The Miranda App must still explain the
adversarial reality of the interrogation process. The App must convey what will
occur, without the suspect necessarily being in the interrogation room or facing
an interrogating detective. Establishing the adversarial context is, thus, an
important part of the introduction.
Such orientation may also include explaining how interrogation fits within the
larger criminal justice system. Most suspects fail to see how what they say in a
police station might impact all of the other players and moments later on in the
criminal justice system.128 Deciding how much to explain presents
complications. Does the Miranda App need to convey what happens to an
123 See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
303, 340 (2010) (“Regulating police misconduct is the special province of the Constitution’s
‘criminal procedure’ clauses.”); David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149,
1150 (2014) (“Since the Warren Court’s revolution of criminal procedure, the primary
approach to regulating law enforcement has been to rely on the Constitution and the judiciary
to establish threshold standards to restrain the police.”).
124 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (“We hold that Miranda [is] a
constitutional decision of this Court . . . .”).
125 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (“[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system . . . .”). See generally Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions:
Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 914-19 (2011-2012)
(asserting that the adversarial nature of our justice system leads to erroneous outcomes).
126 Rogers et al., General Knowledge, supra note 67, at 438-41 (describing large-scale
ignorance of basic concepts of Miranda among a sample jurors).
127 LEO, supra note 57, at 33 (“Interrogators have internalized the values and goals of the
adversaries (i.e., the lawyers) and emphasize case-building over impartial
investigation . . . .”).
128 See Leo, supra note 48, at 1012-15.
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interrogation statement at some future trial? Does it need to explain how police
might use the statement in a criminal prosecution? Does it need to explain the
role of other players in the criminal justice system, such as prosecutors, the
judge, defense counsel? All of these realities—well known to professionals—
may not be known by the suspect. After all, most suspects, when they give a
statement to a specific police investigator, do not think about the long-term
impact of that decision.129 A Miranda App has the ability to correct that
impression and provide a more accurate understanding of the role of confession
in the criminal justice system. It also offers a moment to reflect on big questions
at the heart of Miranda.
So the first step is to provide appropriate context to the suspect about (1) why
they have been handed the Miranda App, and (2) how this Miranda App process
fits within the larger criminal justice system. Without seeking to fully resolve
those answers, the next subsection applies the principles as an illustrative guide.
2. Initial Instructions—Adversarial Context Applied
You—the suspect—enter the criminal justice system after having been
arrested.130 You go through routine booking, providing fingerprints, a mug shot,
biographical information, and are handed an iPad with the simple instruction:
“You need to complete the Miranda App.”
Without micromanaging the design, the Miranda App needs to convey the
following information in the introduction to provide the appropriate contextual
understanding. Again, this introduction explains “the what” of what is about to
happen.
First, an initial introduction must explain that the following process is
designed to inform you of your constitutional rights, and offer a moment to
understand the choice to speak with police or not. The introduction can explain
that the Miranda warnings process comes from the United States Supreme Court
(the highest court in the land), finds its roots in the United States Constitution
(Fifth Amendment), and is an established police practice recognized across the
land. One can imagine visuals of the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and police
reciting Miranda rights, or animations describing where these other abstract
rights come from in some visual form.

129 Laura Smalarz, Kyle C. Scherr & Saul M. Kassin, Miranda at 50: A Psychological
Analysis, 25 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 455, 457 (2016) (“In a recent examination
of the reasoning underlying the Miranda decisions made by 80 pretrial defendants, results
showed that only about half reported that they had considered the long-term risks associated
with waiving their rights.”).
130 Custody would trigger use of the Miranda App. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 441-42 (1984). Because the Miranda App would be portable and accessible on mobile
devices, it could be offered to a suspect outside of the stationhouse. As a matter of
convenience, the process might more easily be accomplished at the stationhouse, but the App
could be provided on a smartphone or other device.
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The introduction should explain that this digital process replaces a police
detective reciting the Miranda warnings. This is necessary, as some suspects
might be familiar with traditional police practice from television, the movies, or
past experience with police.
The introduction should make clear that the information is being provided to
allow the suspect to make an informed choice about whether or not to speak with
police.
The introduction should reaffirm the seriousness of what constitutional rights
are and why a considered decision should be made before claiming them or
waiving them.
The introduction should include a statement explaining that a police
interrogation is just the initial step in a larger adversarial process, and then
provide a limited contextual understanding of the criminal justice process, from
interrogation to trial. This brief overview should explain the roles of the various
players in the criminal justice system.
Finally, the introduction should include a very practical “what is going to
happen next?” section that explains that if the suspect agrees, she will be brought
to an interrogation room and asked questions by police officers.
Again, all of these points of contextual introduction can be done using words,
images, and animations to describe these complex principles. Visualizing the
criminal justice system on a timeline from arrest to trial, communicating why
constitutional rights are important using other constitutional principles or
patriotic images, or giving visual context to the other players in the adversarial
system, might provide more clarity of otherwise abstract ideas.
All of these principles will be repeated throughout the process, but it is
important to provide an initial introductory overview about what is happening
before detailing the specific Miranda warnings or waiver questions.
C. Why Miranda Rights? Explaining Miranda’s Purpose
Explaining the Miranda process, obviously, should be the central goal of the
Miranda App. After the initial introduction offering context, the next step of the
Miranda App should be to accurately inform suspects of why Miranda exists in
the first place.
1. Miranda’s Purpose
The constitutional justification for Miranda warnings comes from the
custodial pressure felt by suspects in a police dominated environment.131
Miranda warnings both counteract that custodial pressure as well as educate
suspects about the available constitutional rights.132 In theory, by being informed

131

See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Terrorism and the Citizenry’s Safety, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2002,
at 4, 6 (“In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court required the police to give
132
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of their constitutional rights to speak or not, suspects will be able to overcome
any inherent environmental pressure and make an informed decision.133
Traditional interrogations usually omit this explanation of Miranda’s
purpose. Miranda warnings are given, but the underlying justifications for the
Miranda process are not similarly provided. Detectives might explain the source
of the protection (the Supreme Court, the Constitution, the Fifth Amendment)
and may explain the necessity of the rights (to protect the suspect), but rarely if
ever does the phrase “custodial pressure” come out of a detective’s mouth. The
omission results from a combination of it both being awkward for police to
acknowledge the police-created custodial pressure (as they seek to reduce that
same pressure through providing the warnings), as well as the fact that police
may not have been instructed on the underlying constitutional theory of
Miranda.
A Miranda App can remedy this omission by explaining why Miranda
warnings exist in the first place. The Miranda App will directly explain the
dangers of custodial environments and the role of constitutional rights. To be
clear, this step is analytically distinct from the question of “why have you been
handed an iPad?,” instead informing suspects of the substantive purpose of the
information they are going to be provided.
In this stage, the Miranda App will explain why the Supreme Court has
chosen to provide suspects with Miranda warnings. The App will explain the
reality of “psychological pressures ‘which work to undermine the individual’s
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely.’”134 From a design perspective, choices exist about the level of detail
necessary to convey at this stage. Conceptually, the App could explain the
history of involuntary confessions leading to the need for Miranda warnings,135
the fear of “the third degree,”136 or the problems of false confessions.137
Alternatively, the App could discuss the natural human, psychological reaction
to stress, questioning, or accusations.138 A wealth of social science studies

warnings that educate the suspects about, and show respect for, their privilege not to speak.”).
133 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
134 Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
135 See generally THOMAS & LEO, supra note 61.
136 See LEO, supra note 57, at 41-77 (detailing various forms of “the third degree” and its
failings, including producing false confessions and harming law enforcement’s image).
137 See generally Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions
in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004) (studying known false confessions that
resulted in wrongful convictions and how actors in the criminal justice system treated those
suspects).
138 Stephanie Madon et al., A Biphasic Process of Resistance Among Suspects: The
Mobilization and Decline of Self-Regulatory Resources, 41 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 159
(2017) (“[I]nterrogations can become psychological pressure cookers that impair suspects’
ability to resist interrogative influence.”).
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supports the very human reaction to interrogation, all of which might be of
interest to a suspect.139 But, both due to practical time constraints and fear of
confusion, most of this detail (more suitable to a criminal procedure law class)
should probably be replaced with a simple declarative statement explaining that
courts have recognized that interrogation settings put stress on people,140 and
that to counteract that stress, individuals must understand their rights.141
If the insight of Miranda is that by understanding constitutional protections,
individuals are somewhat more empowered in facing police, it seems odd not to
inform suspects of this assumption. While accepted in the legal community, it is
hardly obvious that by hearing you have constitutional rights in the abstract, you
feel protected in the reality of the moment. Many people on the wrong end of an
unpleasant police interaction will viscerally understand the limits of
constitutional rights in the face of police authority.142
So, the working assumption that constitutional understanding will
counterbalance police coercion should be explained to the suspect. Again, a
simple declaration that the reason Miranda rights are being provided is to level
an inherently coercive playing field might be sufficient to provide the “why” of
why Miranda exists.143
2. Miranda’s Purpose Applied
The suspect sits in front of the screen. After a brief introduction explaining
“the what” of what will happen with this digital device, the next brief section
explains “the why”—why the Miranda warnings are being given.
While critical, this part need not be long or involved. The only thing necessary
to articulate is the usually unarticulated underlying assumption of why the
Supreme Court thought Miranda was necessary. Two points must be included:
(1) the reality of custodial pressure, and (2) how being informed of one’s
constitutional rights serves to counteract custodial pressure.
This information could be conveyed in a sentence or two. A quote from the
Miranda decision as visual background could be used to emphasize the point
and situate the case in the real-world context of interrogation.144 One can also

139

Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2010) (discussing previous studies of false
confessions, attributing false confessions in part to feelings of “‘hope,’ ‘fear,’ ‘promises,’
‘threats,’ ‘suggestion,’ ‘calculations,’ ‘passive yielding,’ ‘shock,’ ‘fatigue,’ ‘emotional
excitement,’ ‘melancholia,’ ‘auto-hypnosis,’ ‘dissociation,’ and ‘self-destructive despair’”).
140 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-55 (1966).
141 Id. at 467 (“In order to combat these pressures . . . the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”).
142 Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 76 (2006).
143 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
144 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“We have concluded that without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
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imagine the reality of custodial pressure illustrated in a simple animation with a
closed interrogation room and a drop of sweat on the brow of the suspect.
Similarly, one can imagine the counterbalance of constitutional rights being
depicted as a form of power. Some representation that “constitutional knowledge
is power” probably suffices to provide an answer to why Miranda rights are
being given to suspects.
This brief explanation of “why Miranda rights” will also have the effect of
reaffirming the constitutional significance of the moment. By tying
constitutional rights to individual power and choice, the importance of the
decision will be reemphasized.145
D. The Formal Miranda Warnings
A Miranda App must provide the actual Miranda warnings as envisioned by
the Supreme Court and recrafted by law enforcement professionals. As the
Supreme Court has made clear in Florida v. Powell146 and earlier cases, the
Miranda warnings do not require particular magic words to be constitutionally
sufficient.147 As a constitutional requirement, substance counts over form, and
police departments retain flexibility in how to convey those warnings.148 The
Miranda App embraces this flexible approach, and does not seek to mandate any
particular language in the warnings. The App does however take seriously the
importance of suspects’ understanding those rights, and thus incorporates an
overt education-focused approach to explaining Miranda rights.
Such an education-focused approach remains absent in most police practice.
In a traditional interrogation, a police detective will read the Miranda warnings
out loud and may subsequently ask the suspect to read the written warnings.149
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination,
the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those
rights must be fully honored.”).
145 Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose of the
Court’s decision in Miranda was ‘to assure that the individual’s right to choose between
speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469)).
146 559 U.S. 50 (2010).
147 Id. at 63 (“Although the warnings were not the clearest possible formulation of
Miranda’s right-to-counsel advisement, they were sufficiently comprehensive and
comprehensible when given a commonsense reading.”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
203 (1989) (“Reviewing courts therefore need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing
a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings
reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981))).
148 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
149 Leo & White, supra note 52, at 422-38.
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Some detectives will ensure that suspects understand the words in the warnings,
and others will not.150 Some detectives will offer clarifying instruction to
warnings, but most, for fear of undercutting the clarity (and thus legality) of the
written warnings, will not editorialize much on the printed warnings. The result
is a fairly one-directional explanation, leaving the suspect with little practical
ability to seek clarification, admit confusion, or pause for reflection.151
A Miranda App offers a three-fold change to existing practice, allowing: (1)
better comprehension of the words that convey constitutional rights; (2) clarity
about the meaning of constitutional rights; and (3) a space for deliberative
reflection about the decision at hand. By design, a Miranda App can offer a more
intentional educational approach that specifically addresses some of the
weaknesses in current Miranda practice.
1. Language of Miranda Warnings
The Miranda App must convey the foundational principles of Miranda. These
principles include: the right to remain silent, the knowledge that anything you
say can be used against you in a court of law, the right to talk to a lawyer for
advice before questioning, the right to talk to a lawyer during questioning, the
right to have a lawyer appointed for you without cost, and the ongoing nature of
these rights.152 This subsection examines the language chosen to convey those
rights, with the next subsection studying the meanings of the rights
themselves.153
Language facilitates understanding.154 If suspects do not understand the
words within the Miranda warnings, then they likely cannot understand the
meaning of the warnings.155 Studies have shown that the actual words chosen to

150 See Gregory DeClue, Oral Miranda Warnings: A Checklist and a Model Presentation,
35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 421, 425-27 (2007) (describing a process of questioning for
comprehension).
151 LEO, supra note 57, at 27.
152 Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535, 552-56 (2012).
153 Rogers et al., supra note 75, at 124-25; see also Morgan Cloud et al., supra note 71, at
528-30 (discussing how courts evaluate waivers based on their interpretation of Miranda
rights).
154 See Richard Rogers et al., Development and Initial Validation of the Miranda
Vocabulary Scale, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 390 (2009) (“A lack of comprehension of
key Miranda terminology is likely to compromise a suspect’s ability to make a rational
waiver.”).
155 Cloud et al., supra note 71, at 499 (“Miranda conceptualized suspects as rational
decision makers who possessed the cognitive tools necessary to implement the warnings. The
Court assumed that suspects would understand both the meaning and the legal significance of
the warnings. Unless a suspect understands the warnings, they are but meaningless sounds.”
(footnote omitted)); Rogers et al., Everyone Knows, supra note 67, at 302 (noting that survey
participants could recognize Miranda rights but could not identify what those rights were).
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provide the Miranda warnings can range across jurisdictions from 49 words to
547 words, and in sophistication from reading levels appropriate for middle
schools to postgraduate level words.156 Rogers and his colleagues found almost
900 different Miranda warnings among approximately 945 federal, state, and
county jurisdictions.157 Without trying to mandate a particular linguistic formula
for the warnings, certain precautions can be added to improve comprehension.
Take as examples the following eight words or concepts in most Miranda
warnings, “right,” “silent,” “court of law,” “afford,” “appointed,” “represent,”
“exercise,” and “lawyer.” For professionals in the criminal justice field or
attorneys, the use of these terms presents little problem.158 We know “right”
means a legal privilege, not its other meanings of morally correct, or honorable,
or the opposite of wrong.159 We know “silent” means the choice not to answer
questions, and not tacit, or noiseless, or implicit.160 We know “court of law” is a
trial court, even though professionals rarely use that archaic and somewhat
redundant phrasing (why not just say “court”). We know “appointed” means
provided by the court, not scheduled or furnished. We know “represent” means
defend, and not stands for or constitutes. We know “exercise” means use, not
physical activity. And, we know what lawyers do. But, the assumption that
everyone should know this legalistic language and phrasing is empirically
false.161 In fact, many groups, especially vulnerable populations, demonstrate
great difficulty in understanding the language of the traditional Miranda
script.162

156

Rogers et al., supra note 75, at 125.
Id. at 125-27.
158 But see Rogers et al., Everyone Knows, supra note 67, at 314 (“For instance, do they
understand that their right to silence is constitutionally protected against self-incrimination?
With 36.4% of college students and nearly as many defendants (30.9%) erroneously
concluding that silence is likely to incriminate, the idea of an accurate working knowledge
for most defendants is highly suspect.”).
159 See Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
160 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
161 Rogers et al., Everyone Knows, supra note 67, at 307-12 (explaining that defendants
often misunderstand the consequences of exercising their Miranda rights and how their word
choices after their invocation of such rights); Rogers et al., General Knowledge, supra note
67, at 434 (“Even the seemingly basic concept of “‘right to silence”‘ is often seriously
misconstrued. [A]bout one third of both pretrial detainees (30.6%) and university students
(36.4%) failed to recognize that their silence is constitutionally protected and cannot be used
as incriminating evidence.” (citation omitted)).
162 See, e.g., Cooper & Zapf, supra note 11, at 392; William C. Follette, Deborah Davis &
Richard A. Leo, Mental Health Status and Vulnerability to Police Interrogation Tactics, 22
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 42, 44-45; Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Assessing
the Capacity of Persons with Mental Retardation to Waive Miranda Rights: A Jurisprudent
Therapy Perspective, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 55 (2004).
157
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Three related difficulties arise from existing practice. We do not know which
words (if any) a suspect may not understand. We do not want detectives
becoming the grammar police testing suspects for vocabulary comprehension.
Finally, suspects, themselves, may not wish to admit ignorance or confusion
about particular terminology. The result is that the Miranda script assumes
comprehension without any mechanism to clarify real comprehension.163
The Miranda App recognizes this limitation of human capacity, and the
complex diversity of educational backgrounds that Miranda must address.
Without changing the words themselves, an interactive program can provide
definitional clarity for any word that a suspect does not understand. Words in
the warnings could be highlighted, definitions embedded, and contextual
descriptions appended to the existing Miranda warnings. Instead of simply
reading the warnings as written, an interactive app could allow further
interaction with the words to make sure the suspects understood their meaning.
To visualize this process as applied: imagine a suspect sits facing the
computer screen. Words and images appear that demand comprehension. For
example, the program explains, “You have the right to remain silent.” Instead of
just having the text alone, each important word (i.e., “right,” “remain,” and
“silent”) would be underlined with hyperlinks to definitions and illustrations
about the relevant concepts. Major concepts such as “right” would have
additional context to explain what the term means. Click on the link and a
definition appears. Click again and more clarifying information can be provided
through video, animation, or other images. Following each part of the Miranda
warning, a prompt will ask if the suspect would like more information about the
meaning of the terms used. Designed to facilitate understanding without
changing the wording of the Miranda warnings, each component part of the
Miranda warnings could be accompanied by definitions, as well as textual and
non-textual explanations or visualizations.
For those individuals who readily understand the words of Miranda, this extra
level of information can be quickly skimmed over. If suspects do not need extra
information, they can quickly bypass the embedded or linked information. But
for others who might not completely understand a word, or who would be too
embarrassed to ask a detective for more information, a clarifying solution exists.
2. Meaning of Miranda Warnings
Miranda comprehension requires a relatively sophisticated translation of
constitutional principles into actionable protections. Many nuanced
constitutional arguments are embedded in each part of the warnings.
For example, the familiar statements “You have the right to remain silent”
and “Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law” are practical
distillations of a potential course of conduct arising from the Self-Incrimination
163 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Dialogue Approach to Miranda Warnings and
Waiver, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1474-75 (2012).
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment.164 In fact, these rights do not mean one can sit
silently to invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment.165 Instead, as a
doctrinal matter, they mean that the United States Constitution forbids any
unwarned custodial statement from being introduced in the government’s casein-chief at trial.166 The warnings say nothing about use of the statements before
trial as impeachment evidence, or even in collateral matters. The warnings offer
little clarity about how these rights work and against whom. Worse, the warnings
do not explain that instead of sitting silently, a suspect must affirmatively invoke
(speak) to claim their right to silence.167 This complexity, and the resulting
confusion, means that suspects remain uninformed of their rights and
disempowered from claiming them.168
The goal of a successful Miranda App is not only to use existing Supreme
Court language and concepts, but to offer different learning methods to ensure
that suspects better understand the meaning of their rights. Explaining the
meaning of each of Miranda’s component parts will be a critical part of a
functioning Miranda App. While it is not easy to distill the doctrinal confusion
resulting from a half-century of Miranda case law, the next few subsections
highlight the most important aspects of each right that could be clarified for the
suspect.
a.

Right to Remain Silent

A Miranda App must inform the suspect that they have “the right to remain
silent.”169 Assuming the suspect understands as a linguistic matter the meaning
of “right” and “silent,” this shorthand phrasing of the protection against selfincrimination may be sufficient.
But, the value of a Miranda App is that one can ensure that a suspect
completely understands the point. For example, the Miranda court linked the

164 Scholars have disagreed with the Supreme Court’s application of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 12, 850-63.
165 In both Thompkins and Salinas v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that suspects must
affirmatively claim the right. See Harvey Gee, Salinas v. Texas: Pre-Miranda Silence Can Be
Used Against a Defendant, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 727, 748 (2014) (discussing the dangers
of the prosecution’s ability to use suspect’s post-Miranda warning silence at trial).
166 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388 (2010).
167 Id. at 409 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Advising a suspect that he has a ‘right to remain
silent’ is unlikely to convey that he must speak (and must do so in some particular fashion) to
ensure the right will be protected.”).
168 Howe, supra note 13, at 923-24 (“Unless we implausibly assume that people are
generally highly self-destructive, the Miranda Court was correct that interrogated persons
who self-incriminate were usually not acting rationally (even if freely), either because they
were ill-informed, deceived, or mentally impaired.”).
169 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-75 (1966).
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right to remain silent to the ability to freely choose to speak and overcome the
pressure of interrogation. As the Court stated in Miranda:
For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make
them aware of it—the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as
to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite
in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.170
This linkage between information and choice is not intuitive from the phrase
“the right to remain silent.” A Miranda App could make that link clear.
In other words, informing suspects that they have a right to remain silent
should also mean informing them that they also have the power to stop the
process of questioning.171 The suspect has a choice to make. This could be done
with something as simple as a graphic that equates “right to silence” with
“freedom to choose whether to speak with police or not,” or an animation that
shows a suspect invoking the “right to silence” and ending the interview. The
point is to put some context around an oft mentioned but rarely used right.
b. Knowledge that Anything You Say Can Be Used Against You in a
Court of Law
A Miranda App will need to include the warning that “anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law.”172 This warning, as the Miranda Court
recognized, “is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but
also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these
consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and
intelligent exercise of the privilege.”173
Two important considerations are buried in this warning. First is the idea of
explaining “used against.” A plain reading of “used against” from a nonlawyer’s perspective leaves the meaning of the warning unclear. How will a
conversation be used against someone? Practically, what would be used against
me—a recording, a transcript, something else? What does it mean? Will you
show I am a liar, nervous, confused? While anyone familiar with trial practice,
and thus the uses of documentary evidence or impeachment, will be able to
conceptualize future events, anyone without a legal degree might be quite
confused.

170

Id. at 468.
Smalarz, Scherr & Kassin, supra note 129, at 457 (“For example, many people hold the
false belief that invoking one’s right to silence can be used against them, or even that one
could be punished or prosecuted for it. Yet Miranda warnings rarely contain language to
correct such misconceptions. An analysis of 385 Miranda warnings from across the country
revealed that only 7% informed suspects that invoking their rights would result in the
immediate cessation of questioning; none assured suspects that it could not be used as
evidence of guilt.” (citations omitted)).
172 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
173 Id. at 469.
171
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The Miranda App can address this confusion by clarifying what “used
against” means in practice. One can imagine an animation showing a transcript
of a confession being shown to prosecutors, the judge, and the jury. One can
imagine seeing a video of a confession being played in court. Such visualization
of the meaning of “used against” will make the concept a bit clearer.
Similarly, the idea of “a court of law” needs further clarification. In which
courts of law will the statement be used? “Courts of law” handle pretrial,
investigatory, trial, post-trial, and even collateral or civil matters. The warning
accurately warns that the statement could be used in any of these courts, but
how? The warning is not inaccurate, but inadequate. The Miranda App can
address this confusion by explaining what is meant by a “court of law” and how
a statement could be used in future litigation. Each of the terms of art used in
Miranda could have similar explanations.
c.

The Right to Talk to a Lawyer for Advice Before Questioning/The
Right to Talk to a Lawyer During Questioning

Two related rights concerning the ability to speak with a lawyer before and
during questioning must be communicated to the suspect. As recently as
Thompkins, the Supreme Court stated, “[t]he main purpose of Miranda is to
ensure that an accused is advised of and understands the right to remain silent
and the right to counsel.”174 More emphatically, the Miranda Court framed the
issue:
As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated
can be used in evidence against him, this [right to counsel] warning is an
absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial
evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to
stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable
assurance that the accused was aware of this right.175
A Miranda App would ensure that this prerequisite is met and that a suspect
understands that the Fifth Amendment grants individuals the right to consult
with a lawyer before and during questioning.176
While easily stated, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel in the interrogation
room is less easily comprehended or realized. In truth, there is no counsel to
speak with at the moment of interrogation.177 No public defender waits outside

174

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383 (2010) (emphasis added).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72.
176 Id. at 466 (“The presence of counsel . . . would be the adequate protective device
necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the governmentestablished atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.”).
177 See JAMES DUANE, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN INNOCENT: WHAT POLICE
OFFICERS TELL THEIR CHILDREN ABOUT THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 5 (2016) (“You will almost
175
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the interrogation room. Few retained counsel beat detectives to the police
station.178 The Miranda Court itself rejected the ACLU amicus brief’s original
suggestion to mandate a lawyer be present at all custodial interrogations.179 So,
the warnings convey the potentiality of counsel but do little to explain the reality
or role of defense lawyers.
Both points—about the logistical reality of a lawyer and what a lawyer does—
could be clarified by a Miranda App. First, a Miranda App could explain how
and when a suspect might be able to talk to this lawyer. In truth, this might entail
a substantial delay, perhaps until arraignment when a lawyer would be provided
to the suspect. It might also involve a delay if the suspect has the means to afford
an attorney. Both realities pose serious impediments to any interrogation. In
practice, they might forestall the actual interrogation. A Miranda App could
explain the pros and cons of this dilemma. While a suspect has the right to speak
with a lawyer before questioning, this right—practically speaking—interferes
with the ability to talk with detectives at the present moment. A Miranda App
could help a suspect weigh the choice whether to speak or not. An App could
also clarify that the potential right to a lawyer may take some time before
becoming a reality.
This logistical problem is compounded by the fact that some suspects do not
understand what a lawyer might do for them in an interrogation. To someone not
versed in the role of the criminal defense lawyer, saying she can speak with a
lawyer may mean very little. What is a lawyer? What do they do? How might
they be relevant to an interrogation? In a traditional Miranda warning, no
clarification follows about the roles and responsibilities of an attorney. In an
omission that privileges legal sophistication, no explanation of the role of
attorney counseling, advocacy, or education follows the advisement of a “right
to speak with a lawyer.”
A Miranda App, because it seeks to inform a suspect both about the right to
counsel and what counsel might do, could offer a way around (1) the logistical
gap of there not being a human lawyer present, as well as (2) the informational
gap of not understanding what a lawyer might do. The App could—like an actual
lawyer in the station house—explain the pros and cons of speaking with police
at the moment. For some suspects, it makes sense to talk with police
immediately. For others, this decision may not be beneficial. But, an App

certainly not be offered the chance to speak to anyone other than the officer. The only advice
you will receive in that moment is likely to come straight from the police officer . . . .”).
178 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 415 (1986) (relaying how the suspect’s attorney
contacted police officers after his arrest and police discouraged the attorney from going to the
police station by falsely claiming questioning would not start until the following day).
179 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 701, 727 (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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could—in an objective and fair way—walk a suspect through the pluses and
minuses of this important constitutional decision. In addition, it could offer some
background information about what lawyers do in criminal cases, such as their
role, duty, and responsibilities.
d. The Right to Have a Lawyer Appointed for You at No Cost
The Miranda warnings have always advised suspects that no matter their
economic situation, a lawyer would be provided without cost.180 Poverty, the
Supreme Court recognized, should not be a barrier to constitutional
protections.181 Such a right clarifies that a lawyer will be provided, but leaves
ambiguous how this appointment works. Who will appoint the lawyer? How will
it be paid for? Who does this lawyer work for? Is it a government lawyer?
The ambiguity arises, in part because the answer differs depending on the
jurisdiction. Indigent defense systems are different in every state and county.182
Some indigent defense systems are staffed by full-time lawyers, other by parttime attorneys, still others by relying on contractually assigned counsel.183 So,
the claim that a lawyer will be appointed for you free of cost is both true, and
yet unrevealing. Yes, the government will pay for a lawyer, but left unsaid is
how this appointment will turn into an actual physical person to advise and
consult the suspect.
Beyond logistics of who pays the cost lies the question of what exactly is
being paid for by the government. Some people rightly question the quality of
“free” goods and services received from the government and suspect a divided

180

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 472 (“The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of
the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution
applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the
indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those
who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance.”).
182 Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1254-55 (2006); Robert E. Stein, Public Defenders, HUM. RTS., Apr.
2013, at 25, 26 (“According to data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) in 2007,
in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, there are twenty-seven county and hybrid
states with 763 individual offices and twenty-two states with 483 local offices that have a
central state-based public defender office.”).
183 Randolph N. Stone, The Role of State Funded Programs in Legal Representation of
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 205, 209-10 (1993) (“Three
basic program types have evolved throughout the United States to provide legal services to
the indigent accused: (1) assigned counsel programs where lawyers who are members of the
private bar are appointed on a case-by-case basis; (2) contract attorney programs where the
local government contracts with individual private attorneys, law firms or bar associations to
provide representation to certain categories of defendants over a specific period of time; and
(3) public defender programs where a salaried staff of full-time or part-time attorneys provide
defense services.”).
181
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loyalty. The “government,” after all, also pays the salaries of the police,
prosecutors, and the judges, so why would this appointed lawyer be on the
suspect’s side? Without an explanation of how the government divides
responsibilities, why it creates an adversarial system, and who enforces the
duties of defenders, the mere “appointment” of a lawyer does little to answer the
ultimate question of what that “appointment” actually means. Further, the
somewhat sullied reputation of public defenders or lawyers appointed under the
Criminal Justice Act184 may only add to the suspicion of the type of lawyer
appointed.185
All of these issues can be addressed through a Miranda App. A Miranda App,
having already explained the adversarial system, and the role of the defense
lawyer, would need to address these concerns arising from the offer of free legal
assistance. This explanation need not be lengthy, but should directly address the
concerns with logistics and legal duty.186 Specifically, the App should explain
how the government appoints counsel, how the lawyers are chosen, and why the
defense lawyers remain independent of the court and the other government
actors. Again, whether tied to the particular realities of a jurisdiction (or a more
generic explanation), this information can be provided through video, animation,
or text.
e.

The Ongoing Nature of the Miranda Rights

Miranda protections continue throughout the interrogation.187 If at any
moment the suspect wishes to invoke his rights to silence or counsel he can do
so, even after originally waiving those rights. This reality is embedded in the
phrase used to convey the on-going nature of those rights, e.g., “You can decide
at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any
statements.”
This statement is both comforting and counterintuitive. The statement
comforts by granting suspects the ability to change his or her mind, and
essentially control the use of the rights. In Thompkins, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that this control exists throughout the interrogation. A suspect can
“consider the choices he or she faces” and “reassess his or her immediate and
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18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012).
Bonnie Hoffman, Gideon’s Champions: Advocates Fight for the Indigent in Tennessee,
36 CHAMPION 49, 50 (2012) (“‘One of the biggest challenges [in working with clients] is
distrust,’ he explained. ‘Many clients and most of the public have negative opinions about
lawyers and public defenders in particular. They think [public defenders] are not real lawyers
and not as good as paid lawyers.’” (alteration in original)).
186 A defense lawyer’s obligation of zealous advocacy is not known by many individuals
in the criminal justice system, so this legal duty may need to be explained. See MODEL CODE
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
187 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
185
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long term interests” during a lengthy interrogation process.188 Justice Kennedy
conceived of an almost deliberative reflection throughout the interrogation
process. Such a deliberative choice can, of course, only be effectuated if a
suspect understands that the Miranda rights still exist even after formally (or
informally) waiving them.
This leads to confusion for those suspects who might not understand how or
why they can change their minds about speaking with police. Postwaiver, once
the conversation has begun, the ability to choose again may not seem possible.189
The continued coercive environment, the human pressure, and the lack of
understanding of how to reclaim those previously waived rights all increase
confusion.190
A Miranda App would explain the ongoing nature of the rights by clarifying
that the initial waiver can be reconsidered. It might use Justice Kennedy’s
deliberative framework to explain that the power continues throughout the entire
interrogation (and beyond).191 Further, the Miranda App would provide the
“magic words” to invoke silence or counsel, so debates over ambiguous
invocations would be reduced.192 As will be discussed later, this transparency
about what words are necessary to invoke Miranda will avoid later confusion.
3. Reflection
Improving the language and explanations of the rights behind the Miranda
warnings obviously might improve comprehension. But, a Miranda App offers
one other, less obvious, benefit: distance to reflect on one’s decision.
The custodial pressure of a police-dominated interrogation, almost by design,
prevents deep reflection. In the traditional Miranda script, there is no place for
a detective to say, “Look, think about your rights for a few minutes and get back
to me; it is an important decision.” Instead, the pressure for waiver is immediate,
and intentionally so;193 the detective is waiting right in front of the suspect with
a pen and the room for deliberative thought is quite limited.

188

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388 (2010); Ferguson, supra note 163, at 1447
(“The only plausible way to interpret a suspect’s near three-hours of silence and explicit
refusal to sign a Miranda waiver form as an implicit waiver was to presume that during that
entire time the suspect understood the relevant application of his rights and simply chose not
to invoke them.”).
189 See Stuntz, supra note 101, at 988.
190 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
192 Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 409-10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Miranda warnings
give no hint that a suspect should use [the Court’s] magic words, and there is little reason to
believe that police—who have ample incentives to avoid invocation—will provide such
guidance.”).
193 Leo & White, supra note 52, at 42-43.
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The Miranda App creates a space for some thought because it takes place
independent of police controlled questioning. By actual design, the Miranda
App will slowly go through the rights and warnings. By giving suspects a
moment to think and inquire about rights, a natural space will develop to
consider the decision. While digital media does not necessarily encourage deep
reflection, and many people are familiar with simply skipping past all of the fine
print of any computer mediated waiver form,194 the hope will be that some time
and space will be created to think about that decision to waive or not.
E.

Miranda Waiver—Unambiguous Invocation

The entire Miranda process has one final outcome—the waiver or invocation
of a suspect’s constitutional rights. It should be a binary choice, but as any
student of Miranda knows, the gray areas of implicit waiver, ambiguous
invocation, and miscommunication between officers and suspects has made the
process quite uncertain.195 Through its design, the Miranda App seeks to
recapture certainty and force a suspect to make a clear binary choice, thus
avoiding some of the existing legal confusion.
1. Explaining Waiver and Invocation
Much academic ink has been spilt attempting to sort through the Supreme
Court’s rules on waiver and invocation. The doctrine has evolved from a
presumption against finding waiver,196 to one in which implicit waiver can be
found relatively easily.197 Similarly, the clarity required for a suspect to
“unambiguously” invoke the right to silence or counsel leaves more questions
than answers. Courts regularly make judgment calls on the facts, but, ironically,
a demand for unambiguous clarity has not made the doctrine any clearer.
One reason for continued confusion over waiver and invocation is that neither
concept is explained very well during a traditional Miranda script. Many
Miranda warning cards (or documents) include a place for explicit waiver as
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See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print,
99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2014) (“The proposition that most people do not read the small
print, heed the warning labels, or review the ‘Terms and Conditions’ links, is no longer
controversial.”).
195 Weisselberg, supra note 36, at 1577-88 (explaining how easily a suspect
unintentionally waives his rights based on subsequent Supreme Court interpretation and
officer conduct).
196 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (“An express written or oral
statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong
proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to
establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.”).
197 Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381 (“There is good reason to require an accused who wants to
invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unambiguously.”).
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well as explicit invocation, but those same cards do not explain the impact of
implicit waiver, and nor do they clue in suspects about what “magic words” need
to be said to unambiguously invoke Miranda’s protection.198 As criminal
procedure students regularly query, “If the Supreme Court wants an
unambiguous invocation, why don’t they just tell suspects that is the rule?”
In the context of the larger Miranda educational project, a Miranda App can
improve instructions for both waiver and invocation. More appealingly, it can
also memorialize the intent of the suspect with a clarity lacking in a human
system. The Miranda App script will force suspects to make a choice—waive or
invoke—and do so in a manner that will be unambiguous. Probably to the relief
of most courts, debates over ambiguous invocations should end.199
2. Waiver and Invocation Applied
The Miranda App’s approach to waiver and invocation tracks the traditional
practice with one big change: it explains in a transparent manner the
consequences of each choice and then forces the suspect to make a choice.
In essence, the App provides a decision tree for suspects. For suspects who
wish to waive their rights, the App explains the meaning of waiver and the
possible benefits of talking with police. For suspects who wish to invoke, the
App explains the consequences of invoking, and further explains that such a
choice will constitute “an unambiguous invocation” of Miranda rights.200
Because the computer will guide the choices into a binary framework, there will
be no option for an ambiguous assertion. Because there will be either a waiver
or invocation, there will be no cause to debate implicit waivers.201
The decision tree design and binary choice of the system removes much of
the human miscommunication. It also provides clear proof of the choice. The
preliminary inquiries of “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer”202 and “[d]o you
think I need a lawyer”203 will be answered (or not answered) by the Miranda
App as opposed to the detective. The App will make the choice, answers, and
decision clear before the suspect speaks with the detective.

198

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (“[T]he suspect must unambiguously
request counsel.”); see also DUANE, supra note 177, at 111-19.
199 As a caveat, there will be situations in which, after the suspect waives using the
Miranda App, the suspect will want to invoke his or her Miranda rights later during the
interrogation. In those cases, the Miranda App will not be of much assistance and the ordinary
rules of Miranda will apply.
200 Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381.
201 As a second caveat, there may be cases of “no decision,” in which the suspect simply
does not decide using the App. Again, in those cases detectives will simply resort to the
traditional methods.
202 Davis, 512 U.S. at 462.
203 Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Finally, the Miranda App will provide explicit instructions of the “magic
phrases” to invoke Miranda after an interrogation has begun.204 The suspect will
be informed that to invoke the right to silence she must state, “I would like to
remain silent” and to invoke the right to counsel she must state, “I would like a
lawyer.” While variations of these phrases might be acceptable to a court
interpreting invocation, the App will provide instruction on the words that will
(without interpretation) clearly signal an invocation so police officers know how
to respond appropriately.
F.

Miranda Assessment

The Miranda waiver process only works if the suspect understands the
warnings and chooses to speak with officers. The difficulty has always been how
to assess the level of comprehension of the suspect. How do you know the
warnings worked as designed? The Miranda App can offer some improvement
on any ultimate expert or legal judgment by providing more information about
the Miranda process. By design, the Miranda App can offer clues as to how
every suspect interacts with the software. In addition, a designer could
incorporate actual assessment tests to ensure adequate comprehension.
1. Assessment by Design
For decades, experts have studied how suspects grasp the Miranda
warnings.205 In thousands of individual criminal cases, Miranda competence has
been litigated. Experts routinely testify about levels of comprehension and some
of the problems facing individuals in making an informed judgment.206 Miranda
assessment mechanisms such as the Grisso tests,207 have allowed a measure of
objective assessment to make its way into court.208 The difficulty of these
assessments, however, is that such expert analysis usually takes place well after
the Miranda warnings were given, and can only recreate an artificial simulation
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This language would track existing Supreme Court requirements.
Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases,
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 26, 28; Frumkin, supra note 10, at 326; Grisso, supra note 65,
at 1152-54; J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical
Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977);
Rachel Kahn, Patricia A. Zapf & Virginia G. Cooper, Readability of Miranda Warnings and
Waivers: Implications for Evaluating Miranda Comprehension, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
119, 123-25 (2006); Rogers et al., Everyone Knows, supra note 67, at 302; Rogers et al.,
General Knowledge, supra note 67, at 432.
206 THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 150 (2003).
207 The Grisso tests, developed by Thomas Grisso, measure “the capacities or competence
of defendants to have understood their rights and to have waived them voluntarily prior to
making the confession to police officers.” Id. at 149.
208 See id. at 157-62; Grisso, supra note 65, at 1143-44.
205
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of the process after the fact.209 Sometimes, if the Miranda warnings are
videotaped, and the expert hired soon after arrest, the delay will not be too
long.210 But, other times the issue can be litigated months or years after the
relevant time period of the interrogation.211
The Miranda App can offer real-time data collection of how a suspect
interacts with the device. Even without formal assessments, a study of how long
the suspect takes to complete each section, the types of clarifying responses he
seeks out, the level of confusion with the terminology, in combination with the
actual answers given to the questions, will provide clues about comprehension.
The App videotaping the suspect’s facial features while he uses the App creates
an additional record of his level of comprehension, intoxication, mental illness,
or physical illness.
Software can be designed to assess comprehension beyond affirmative waiver
or invocation. The Grisso tests essentially require subjects to explain in their
own words the meaning of the various Miranda rights.212 A similar design
element could be included in the Miranda App. After a reading of the rights, but
before waiver or invocation, the App could require passing a threshold test to
see if, in fact, the suspect understood the warnings. The answers would be
memorialized for future study. Whether or not there was an ultimate waiver,
wrong answers on these assessment questions could clue in the reviewing expert
or judge about possible comprehension problems.
While time consuming, this type of informal check is sometimes done by
police detectives trying to ensure that suspects understand their rights.213 Asking
a suspect to define a term of art, or to repeat their understanding of a right, is a
common tactic to ensure understanding (and also protect against future litigation
about competence to waive).214 The Miranda App could build that double-check
procedure into the system with a few questions and prompts.
More broadly, experts have identified systemic comprehension problems for
certain vulnerable populations—the intellectually disabled, juvenile offenders,
or the mentally ill—who routinely fail to grasp the meaning of Miranda.215 The
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Ferguson, supra note 163, at 1438 (“The central tension in any disputed confession case
arises from the fact that the tests to evaluate the suspect’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver are conducted months after the relevant time of the interrogation. . . . This tension
exists because current Miranda practice fails to develop an adequate record of a suspect’s
knowledge and understanding at the time of the waiver.”).
210 See id. at 1481.
211 See id. at 1438.
212 GRISSO, supra note 206, at 165.
213 DeClue, supra note 150, at 423.
214 See id.
215 LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 78 (William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 2005) (“[P]eople with
mental retardation do not typically understand their Miranda rights at anything approaching

2017]

THE MIRANDA APP

973

Miranda App can be designed to flag issues of comprehension and
understanding for these groups. Assessment measures can be built within the
software to identify the common struggles from certain groups, which, in turn,
will allow for a better understanding of how certain people understand (or fail
to understand) Miranda.
2. Assessment Applied
To improve assessment in individual cases, the Miranda App could be
designed with three levels of comprehension checks. These levels would be seen
to observers as “red flags” for possible comprehension problems.
At the first level, a flag might be raised if the subject took an inordinately long
time, clicked on all of the explanatory features, or had trouble completing the
process. A time stamp from start to finish would be available to gauge speed,
and subjects who took a long time or seemed confused by words or terminology
could be identified as presenting possible comprehension issues. In addition, the
designers might include several decision-tree choices that required a display of
affirmative knowledge, or a series of prompts that require consistent answers.
An inconsistent answer would show confusion. One obvious concern for the
Miranda App will be that some vulnerable or compromised suspects will mask
their lack of comprehension by agreeing to the prompts without understanding
their rights.216 The App will be designed to develop red flags for comprehension
and developmental disabilities to catch these issues.
At a second level, the Miranda App could ask specific questions to assess
comprehension. This direct assessment would clearly show whether a suspect
understood the warnings or not. The App could instruct a suspect to “Please state
in your own words whether you have to talk to police.” The answer could reveal
gaps in knowledge or competence. This system could work with multiple choice
or true/false answers as well. The assessments could serve as both a double
check on understanding, and also develop a record of possible comprehension
problems.
At the third level, the Miranda App would include a background
questionnaire that could include personal information related to educational
achievement, special education, age, prior experience with police, mental
illness, mental health medication, intoxication, injury, sleep deprivation, stress,

an acceptable level.”); Cloud et al., supra note 71, at 528-30 (describing how courts use
suspects’ intelligence, age, previous police encounters, and previous warnings to determine
whether they understood the Miranda warnings police gave them); Kassin et al., supra note
139, at 4 (stating that a goal of their paper is to “identify the dispositional characteristics . . .
and situational-interrogation factors . . . that influence the voluntariness and reliability of
confessions”); Rogers et al., supra note 82, at 63 (stating that Miranda warnings to juveniles
range in readability and summarizing the article as recommending simplified language for
Miranda warnings).
216 This would be similar to the multiple-choice exam taking strategy of just circling “C”
down the line in the hope of getting some answers correct.
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confusion, and other possible obstacles to full comprehension. While not
directly related to informing the suspect of their Fifth Amendment rights, the
App will be designed to collect other data points to assist experts in evaluating
mental health, literacy and/or competence issues for vulnerable suspects.
Answers to some of these questions might also present a red flag for
comprehension issues that could be evaluated by courts.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR THE MIRANDA APP
The Miranda App offers five significant advantages to the current approach
of explaining Fifth Amendment rights. The arguments are less technological
than theoretical, and offer a way forward to capitalize on the strengths of
Miranda, while at the same time remedying the doctrine’s practical weakness.
First, by interposing a digital medium between the suspect and the Fifth
Amendment, a Miranda App can reduce custodial pressure. The all too human
pressure of a detective waiting for an answer dissipates when the detective is not
in the room. Second, by signifying an independent source of legal rights, the
Miranda App serves to rebalance constitutional power away from the police.
Third, a Miranda App can ensure that a suspect “understands” Miranda as
required by Thompkins.217 Fourth, building on the Supreme Court’s recognition
that Miranda’s “core virtue” has been “clarity and precision,”218 the App will
establish a set procedure for police to follow, as well as clear instructions for
suspects to follow. Finally, the Miranda App will be designed to collect helpful
information for prosecutors, defense lawyers, and experts litigating the adequacy
of warnings and waiver in individual cases, as well as to capture global data
useful for academic researchers studying Miranda practice. In doing so, the
Miranda App will signal the beginning of a best practices approach to Miranda
allowing for a more cohesive and efficient approach to an otherwise
individualized police practice. Each of these claims will be discussed in turn.
A. Custodial Pressure
The central insight of Miranda is that the interrogation room creates a
coercive environment.219 Yet, the Miranda warning and waiver decision occurs
217

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010).
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 288 (2011) (Alito, J. dissenting) (“[A] ‘core
virtue’ of Miranda has been the clarity and precision of its guidance to ‘police and courts.’
(quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 694 (1993))); see also infra Section III.D.
219 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (“We have concluded that without
proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of
crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the
exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
218
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within that same coercive space. As scholars have shown, many Miranda
waivers suffer from the same coercive defects as the actual confession.220 The
Miranda App, by removing the police officer from the process of advising or
overseeing the waiver, serves to avoid direct human coercion.
As envisioned, the Miranda App would be designed to reduce some of the
physical, temporal, and emotional pressure of a detective-led process. First, all
of the information would be coming from a third-party digital source. The
detective would have no role. Second, the time pressure of a detective waiting
for an answer would be removed from the detective’s control. Police will still
need an answer about invocation or waiver, but the suspect will have time to
think about it away from the detective’s pressuring gaze. Third, the App would
be designed to foster rational decision-making. The process would both literally
force the suspect to think about the choices, and also allow an answer that does
not seem to disappoint the detective. It is hard for any human to say “no” to
someone who wants something from us. Humans like to please, and by removing
the human from the questioning, it makes it easier to make an unemotional
choice.
Removing the human interface of interrogation does not eliminate custodial
pressure. The Miranda Court also focused on how an environment of isolation
and ignorance combine to pressure suspects. Simply put, being alone and
without contact with the outside world, or ignorant of the legal or procedural
process, undermines a suspect’s ability to resist the police-dominated
environment.221 A Miranda App offers a counterweight to the coerciveness of
the environment. The information comes from a third-party, non-law
enforcement source, thus offering some connection to the outside world. By
providing information about rights, options, and legal protections, the Miranda
App offers contextual and substantive information to address any ignorance
about the legal process. By providing a more objective source of information,
suspects will be physically and informationally shielded (a bit) from the police.
The Miranda App, not a police agent, will provide suspects the constitutional
lessons needed to understand the purpose and practical application of Miranda.
The computer program—not the police—will describe the legal choices
available.222 While the coercive environment will not be eliminated, the pressure
might be ameliorated.

420 (1986).
220 See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 454 (arguing that it is doubtful that Miranda warnings
dispel compulsion and instead “liberate the police” and allow custodial interrogation to
continue).
221 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
222 See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose of the
Court’s decision in Miranda was ‘to assure that the individual’s right to choose between
speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469)).

976

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:935

B. Constitutional Power
A Miranda App shifts the source of constitutional power away from the
police. Miranda rights would no longer be “granted” by police. One of the
inherent limitations of traditional Miranda warnings is that they are provided by
police officers who seemingly control the constitutional protections. In 1965,
Kamisar warned:
[W]hen we expect the police dutifully to notify a suspect of the very means
he may utilize to frustrate them—when we rely on them to advise a suspect
unbegrudgingly and unequivocally of the very rights he is being counted
on not to assert—we demand too much of even our best officers.223
Fifty years later, proving both his prescience and the failure of Miranda
warnings, Kamisar reflected:
There is reason to believe that the delivery of the Miranda warnings is
sometimes, perhaps even routinely, undermined by police interrogators
who (a) blend the warnings with booking questions or (b) build a rapport
with suspects before advising them of their rights or (c) deliver the
warnings as if they were merely bureaucratic triviality or (d) inform
suspects at the outset that they will not be able to tell the police “their side
of the story” unless they first waive their rights.224
Not only are the incentives skewed, but from the suspect’s perspective, the
constitutional power also appears to be connected to the detective granting or
withholding constitutional rights. As Tracey Maclin has written, the police
become “the law”—the source of constitutional power.225
In truth, of course, the Fifth Amendment’s protections exist outside police
control, and were designed to counteract police power. But, because the
information is mediated through police officials, the source of that power gets
muddied in practice.226 A Miranda App that locates the source of constitutional

223

Kamisar, supra note 106, at 35.
Yale Kamisar, A Look Back at the “Gatehouses and Mansions” of American Criminal
Procedure, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 645, 654 (2015).
225 Tracey Maclin, A Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, with
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (2015) (reviewing
THOMAS & LEO, supra note 61) (“Just as a police officer may announce that he is the ‘law’
during a street encounter with a citizen, so too, during interrogation sessions, police detectives
are the ‘law.’ The ‘law,’ and how it is employed in the interrogation room, reflects American
culture.”).
226 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (“[T]he Court has recognized that the
interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive’ and that, as a consequence, there exists a
substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate
efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion. Miranda
attempted to reconcile these opposing concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert
some control over the course of the interrogation.” (citation omitted)).
224
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power away from the police shifts that power back to the individual. The App
serves its own mediating influence to separate constitutional rights from police
control.
Finally, as pure information, the Miranda App empowers citizens to exercise
their constitutional rights. While somewhat naïve in the face of the reality of
police interrogation practices, the Supreme Court has often emphasized the
importance of free choice.227 The Court’s theory being that an informed citizen
is a powerful citizen, one who can use constitutional rights to stand up to a
powerful state. A Miranda App helps empower citizens by reminding (or
teaching) them that their constitutional rights exist independent of and,
fundamentally in opposition to, the government.
C. “Understanding”
If courts care that suspects actually understand their constitutional rights
before invoking or waiving them, the Miranda practice must address how to
encourage “understanding.” A Miranda App designed to improve linguistic
comprehension, inform about contextual realities, and educate about
constitutional meaning attempts to take this principle seriously.
Justice Kennedy in Thompkins emphasized that “understanding” Miranda is
the key to its effectiveness.228 Justice Kennedy repeated the importance of
understanding before waiver half a dozen times:
“As a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who,
with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent
with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection
those rights afford.”229
“Butler made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through
‘the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a
course of conduct indicating waiver.’”230
“If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the accused
made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient
to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights. The prosecution must
make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights.”231

227

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (“Once warned, the suspect is free to
exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities.”).
228 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384-85 (2010).
229 Id. at 385 (emphasis added).
230 Id. at 384 (emphasis added) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373
(1979)).
231 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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“In sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings,
and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent
by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”232
The Thompkins Court, however, failed to provide any mechanism to determine
whether a suspect actually understood his or her rights. In fact, the Court just
presumed constitutional understanding from a failure to signify otherwise.233
A Miranda App will carefully explain the rights and focus on making sure the
language, meaning, and substance of the rights are adequately conveyed. Unlike
the facts in Thompkins, where the Court assumed understanding, the Miranda
App will be designed to provide a mechanism to prove “understanding.” A
prosecutor can build a record to show exactly what a suspect did, what
information was provided, how she responded, and why this constitutes an
informed waiver.234
To the Supreme Court, “understanding Miranda” matters because it protects
free choice.235 The Court has repeatedly linked understanding to a full and
informed waiver.236 In making such a linkage, the Court implicitly
acknowledged the importance of a contextual understanding of Miranda rights.
Theoretically, one could be satisfied with merely a “factual understanding” of
Miranda. Once read, a suspect could say, “I heard the words, and understand
that Miranda warnings exist.” Alternatively, one could demand a contextual
understanding of Miranda. Not only did one hear the words, but they also
understood what those words meant in the context of the situation.237 As Saul
Kassin and his colleagues have explained in the context of juvenile waiver:
232

Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added).
See id. at 385 (“[T]here is no contention that Thompkins did not understand his rights;
and from this it follows that he knew what he gave up when he spoke.”).
234 It is interesting to note that the officers in Thompkins did have the suspect read the
warnings out loud as a test of comprehension. Id. at 386. The Miranda App offers a more
thorough and intentional variation on this police tactic.
235 Cloud et al., supra note 71, at 498.
236 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (“The fundamental purpose
of the Court’s decision in Miranda was ‘to assure that the individual’s right to choose between
speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966))); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)
(“[W]aiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 308 (1985) (“Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding
whether or not to make a statement to the authorities.” (emphasis added)).
237 Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study
of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 43 (2006) (“Although the Miranda process
focuses primarily on factual understanding of the words of the warning, a waiver of rights
also involves the ability to make rational decisions and to appreciate the consequences of
relinquishing them. Simply understanding the abstract words of a Miranda warning may not
enable a person to exercise the rights effectively.” (footnote omitted)).
233
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[O]ne may factually understand that “I can have an attorney before and
during questioning” yet not know what an attorney is or what role an
attorney would play. Others may understand the attorney’s role but
disbelieve that it would apply in their own situation—as when youth cannot
imagine that an adult would take their side against other adults, or when a
person with paranoid tendencies believes that any attorney, even his own,
would oppose him.238
Traditional Miranda practice adequately conveys a factual understanding, but
largely fails to ensure a contextual understanding. Justice Kennedy’s emphasis
on “understanding” in Thompkins seems to acknowledge the importance of a
contextual understanding. He writes that it is not enough for police to simply
read the warnings, but “[t]he prosecution must make the additional showing that
the accused understood these rights.”239 This second step requires more than a
factual understanding, although does not settle exactly how much information
needs to be provided or comprehended.
A Miranda App resolves the uncertainty by providing both a factual and
contextual understanding. A Miranda App can ensure a real understanding of
Miranda warnings and waiver at a far more sophisticated level than current
practice. If utilized, a Miranda App would provide a strong argument against a
defense challenge that the suspect did not understand his or her Miranda rights.
D. “Clarity”
A Miranda App will educate suspects with a clear, complete, and
constitutionally approved explanation of Fifth Amendment rights. The language
of the videos and warnings will be informed by Supreme Court cases and thus
should survive constitutional challenge. Such an approach will avoid cases like
Powell in which the Supreme Court had to bless admittedly imperfect Miranda
warnings.240 In addition, this approach will serve to simplify the almost 400
different variations of Miranda warnings used by jurisdictions across
America.241
Clarity has always been important to the Supreme Court. In case after case,
the Court held that the warnings must “clearly inform[]” the suspect.242 The
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Kassin et al., supra note 139, at 98.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (emphasis added).
240 Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010) (“The four warnings Miranda requires are
invariable, but this Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must
be conveyed.”).
241 Rogers et al., supra note 75, at 126.
242 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966); see also, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600, 622 (2004) (“Miranda’s clarity is one of its strengths . . . .”); Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 425 (1986) (“As we have stressed on numerous occasions, ‘[o]ne of the principal
advantages’ of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984))).
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suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to counsel.243 The suspect must
unambiguously invoke the right to silence.244 As Justice Alito stated in his
dissent in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,245 “Miranda’s prophylactic regime places a
high value on clarity and certainty.”246 And in Moran v. Burbine,247 Justice
Stevens wrote:
[T]he interest in clarity that the Miranda decision was intended to serve is
not merely for the benefit of the police. Rather, the decision was also, and
primarily, intended to provide adequate guidance to the person in custody
who is being asked to waive the protections afforded by the Constitution.248
A Miranda App, similarly, provides clarity to both suspects and police. If the
purpose of Miranda warnings was to lay down “concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow”249 then a software
program that structures those guidelines into computer code will be even more
settled. Unlike the very human interview process that can change depending on
the situation, the Miranda App will be fixed. Every suspect will receive similar
instruction and similar information. If the “‘core virtue’ of Miranda has been the
clarity and precision of its guidance to ‘police and courts,’”250 then such a
regularized computer system strengthens that virtue even more. As stated, the
Miranda App would provide a mechanism for a clear (“unambiguous
invocation”) of rights that is now required after Davis251 and Thompkins252 and
would be designed to require a clear yes/no as to waiver prior to interrogation.
The Miranda App will also be easy to use.253 Police will hand over the
computer to the suspect. The suspect will follow the prompts and complete the
process. All the information will be recorded. The police officers will not have
to do anything else during the interrogation. But, perhaps even more enticingly,
police will avoid future litigation about waiver or invocation. Today, police
negotiate a minefield of potential traps about how they administer the warnings
or how they obtain waiver. Because there are no set practices of how Miranda

243

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 382.
245 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
246 Id. at 282 (Alito, J., dissenting).
247
475 U.S. 412 (1986).
248 Id. at 461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966).
250 J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 288 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680, 694 (1993)).
251 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
252 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010).
253 Cf. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) (“As we have stressed on numerous
occasions, ‘one of the principal advantages’ of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its
application.” (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984))).
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warnings should be given (just that they are given when believed to be legally
necessary by police), each case presents its own potential litigation challenge.
Using the Miranda App, prosecutors can meet their burden to prove waiver.254
The Miranda App will save time for prosecutors in litigating Miranda waiver
after confession. Technology has provided for efficiencies in all manner of life.
A Miranda App will similarly provide for a streamlined process of waiver or
invocation. The plug-and-play nature of the App will allow police to simply start
the App with the information collected without any further manual effort. For
many routine arrests, this process will simplify booking, paperwork, and
evidence collection. The technology will also streamline post-confession
litigation as the trial courts will be presented with a transparent record of the
warnings and decisions of the suspect. Lengthy pretrial hearings about Miranda
will be short-circuited by a clear and well-established record of waiver or
invocation.
E. Data
Despite fifty years of practice, and the increasingly routine use of
electronically recording interrogations, experts still do not know what happens
in most interrogation rooms.255 A lack of data has been part of academic debate
about Miranda for years.256 A Miranda App will provide a new way to collect
data.
Every Miranda interrogation potentially involves a useful data point in a
larger dataset of national police practices. But, because of the nature of how
Miranda interrogations traditionally occur—in relative secrecy with criminal
cases attached—researchers see only a fraction of the problems in current
Miranda practice. Usually, a problem arises from a criminal case involving a
disputed constitutional issue. Occasionally, a researcher gains access to a set of
interrogation videos or transcripts, or alternatively conducts a structured
academic experiment.257 But, generally, Miranda assessment is analyzed in
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Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010) (“To establish a valid waiver, the State
must show that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the ‘high standar[d]
of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights [set forth] in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).’” (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475)).
255 Ten years ago, Feld wrote, that “[a]lthough four decades have passed since the Supreme
Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, remarkably little more observational empirical research
exists now than did then about what actually occurs inside an interrogation room.” Feld, supra
note 237, at 28 (footnote omitted). While research has certainly been conducted over the past
decade on Miranda, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, no large scale empirical study
has changed the sense that more data on Miranda practices is needed.
256 FELD, supra note 56, at 33; Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 267 (1996) (acknowledging the dearth of empirical research from
1966 to 1996).
257 See Feld, supra note 237, at 61 (describing one study in Ramsey County, Minnesota
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isolation through a particular criminal case or episodically in jurisdictions where
data is available. A Miranda App can help develop data relevant for both
individual cases and provide a better picture of national practice.
One of the innovations behind digital education software is the ability to track
progress at a granular level.258 Every click or query can be evaluated. The time
taken on different sections can be analyzed. For example, if a particular term of
art in the Miranda script regularly confuses users, then that information can be
captured and studied. If a particular question always requires more information
or an inordinate amount of time to complete, that section could be flagged for
more clarification. Currently, we do not know in any systemic way how suspects
understand Miranda. Once widely accepted, the Miranda App can provide a
national sample of how suspects understand Miranda and the legal terminology
that underlies Miranda. Each Miranda moment will be cataloged, saved, and
archived for study at some later time. Researchers may also someday design a
report so that judges, lawyers, and others can get a sense of how this particular
suspect scored on the App. This summary report will mirror existing expert
reports on Miranda comprehension tests.
In creating this database of Miranda reports and raw information, the Miranda
App will begin the process of developing national standards for best practices
on Miranda. Miranda is a fragmented doctrine with an equally fragmented
practice. The language of Miranda warnings varies in sophistication.259 The
habits of police officers vary by jurisdiction. While millions of Miranda
colloquies have occurred, scholars have only studied a limited number of cases.
Worse, police supervisors are not likely to know much about what happens
inside the interrogation room. By switching to a national, data-collecting system,
a new practice can develop around improving what works and what does not
work in the existing Miranda warnings and waiver process. Similar to the impact
of the original Miranda decision, this will help standardize and professionalize
the process.260

“because of its proximity and the willingness of the Ramsey County Attorney and her
prosecutorial staff to cooperate”).
258 David Streitfeld, Teacher Knows if You’ve Done the E-Reading, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2013, at A1 (discussing textbooks that “know when students are skipping pages, failing to
highlight significant passages, not bothering to take notes—or simply not opening the book
at all”).
259 Ferguson, supra note 163, at 1450-51.
260 Leo, supra note 49, at 670 (“Miranda has increased police professionalism by rendering
interrogation practices more visible to and thus more subject to supervision and control by
other actors within the criminal justice system—especially police managers, prosecutors, and
judges.”).
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IV. CONCERNS AND RESPONSES
A modern “Miranda Machine” stirs up old debates and creates new problems
that must be addressed. Many of the traditional critiques which have long
dogged Miranda can also be leveled at a Miranda App. Questions of whether a
Miranda App would disrupt police practice, whether it adds unnecessary
prophylactic protections, or whether it might increase invocations (and thus
decrease confessions) sound familiar echoes to longstanding criticisms of the
Miranda doctrine.261 But, new problems also arise, involving technological
literacy, informational fatigue, validation, digital security, and legal
interpretation. While not unfamiliar concepts to traditional Miranda warnings
and waiver practice, they must be updated and addressed for a digital world. This
section briefly examines both the traditional objections to a Miranda App, as
well as newly arising problems that emerge from a digital medium.
A. Traditional Objections
The first traditional objection involves the age-old wisdom, “If it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it.” If police practice with Miranda works, why introduce something
new—even if innovative—to an established routine? This idea obtains some
constitutional grounding in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Dickerson v.
United States262 upholding the constitutionality of Miranda on the logic that
“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where
the warnings have become part of our national culture.”263 Or, as Chief Justice
Burger wrote, “The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law
enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures . . . .”264 Why, alter
something that has been successfully adapted to law enforcement needs?
This Article is born out of the observation that the current Miranda practice
is, in fact, broken, in that it fails to reduce custodial pressure or adequately
inform suspects of constitutional rights.265 Miranda may work for the police, but
not the suspects. Taking the Supreme Court at its word about the important role
Miranda plays to reduce police coercion, the current practice needs an update.
In attempting to reduce coercive pressure and increase understanding, the
Miranda App amplifies the values of empowerment and education to strengthen
the traditional process.
A related concern may be that the Miranda App might be too difficult to
implement and, thus, cuts against principles of efficiency and established police
practice. This argument can be quickly overcome by two rather simple points.
First, in the vast majority of cases, using the Miranda App will be easier than

261 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra
note 98, at 106, 115.
262 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
263 Id. at 443.
264 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment).
265 See supra Part I.
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the traditional practice. A police officer merely needs to hand over the digital
device and wait for the suspect to complete it. In terms of time and effort, it
reduces the burden on police. From a systems perspective, the use of the
Miranda App will also reduce pretrial hearings over coerced waivers and save
detectives time in court. The data from the App will be standardized and routine,
and thus readily analyzable. Second, in those cases in which use of the Miranda
App is not practicable for some reason, it does not need to be used. The Miranda
App is an option, not a mandate, and there may be certain cases or types of
interviews or interrogations where the old-fashioned, traditional process may be
more appropriate.
The biggest objection—and the most controversial—involves whether police
actually want to improve Miranda’s limitations through this App. If the
reduction of custodial pressure and increased constitutional understanding
increases invocation and thus decreases confessions, then why would a police
department adopt such a tool? This question reveals the true tension in
Miranda.266 If police reject the Miranda App because they fear that an accurate
and thorough explanation of the Miranda warnings will cause suspects to invoke
their rights, and thus prefer to follow traditional practices that minimize or
undermine constitutional understanding, then police should publicly admit that
decision. Offering the Miranda App provides a clear choice, and if police choose
less constitutional understanding, then police should also defend that choice.
Interrogating detectives could be asked in court why they chose to follow a
traditional Miranda routine, rather than the new (and hopefully more
informative) alternative. There may very well be good reasons for the choice in
individual cases, but the choice should be addressed.
An honest evaluation of Miranda (after fifty years) has to ask whether the
doctrine’s continued acceptance by law enforcement, in part, results from its
impotence in addressing the core concerns of custodial interrogation. If the
honest reason for acceptance is that Miranda does not work, then that reality
should spur change and innovation, not continued acceptance of a failed
practice. Police, judges, and lawyers sworn to uphold the Constitution should
not be comfortable with an interrogation practice that undermines Fifth
Amendment protections.
The tension may also be overstated. Because the Miranda App has never been
used, we do not know if it will increase invocations. Fear of the impact of the
original Miranda decision proved largely unfounded.267 Seventy-eight to ninety-

266 See Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police
Interrogation in America, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE, supra note 98, at 65, 67 (suggesting that
police departments implement Miranda begrudgingly by stating that investigators deliver
Miranda warnings “less than enthusiastically” or “very consciously recite the warnings in a
trivializing manner so as to maximize the likelihood of eliciting a waiver”).
267 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 501 (1996) (“[T]he Miranda
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six percent of suspects still waive Miranda.268 Further, the goal of the Miranda
App is not to discourage confessions or encourage invocations, but to inform,
and the design will intentionally try to maintain an impartial and fair discussion
of rights and options. It may well be the case that after understanding the various
options, suspects choose to speak with police as they have done in the past.269
The Miranda App would not be giving legal advice as a criminal defense lawyer
might, nor would it be offering encouragement to speak like a police detective
might. The Miranda App would simply provide constitutional information
without editorializing or influencing a response. In fact, police departments or
police affiliated groups could design their own Miranda App consistent with the
principles of this Article.
While we cannot know the effect of our proposal, at least the Miranda App
will provide data to evaluate its impact. As discussed before, the debate over
Miranda has been clouded by a lack of sufficient data about how Miranda
warnings impact invocation.270 Because of the fragmented nature of police
practice, and the lack of data recording mechanisms, researchers largely
speculate about Miranda’s impact. A Miranda App, because it will be digitized
and uniform, will allow much better analysis about how it positively or
negatively impacts the interrogation process.
B. Technological Objections
While new technological solutions offer innovation and improvement,
technology can also be disempowering, confusing, and impersonal. Adding a
technological challenge to the already stressful situation of police interrogation
may, for certain people, undermine the learning process and create distance or
uncertainty. A Miranda App must confront technological objections directly and
be designed to address them.
1. Technological Literacy
A Miranda App theoretically would be available to all suspects. As criminal
suspects range in age from teenagers to senior citizens, and from the highly
educated to the barely educated, the level of technological literacy will vary
accordingly. Some suspects may not feel comfortable learning through a
computer screen and may lack the basic computer skills to scroll through a selfsafeguards do not pose any serious impediment to effective law enforcement.”); see also
Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the
Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4-5 (2000) (debunking the theory that Miranda caused clearance
rates to fall).
268 See Leo, supra note 98, at 275.
269 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of
Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383 (2007); Alan C. Michaels,
Rights Knowledge: Values and Tradeoffs, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1355, 1364-65 (2007).
270 See FELD, supra note 56, at 33 (“[W]e know remarkably little about what happens when
police question suspects . . . .”).
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paced educational lesson. Some suspects may be comfortable with the
technology, but become confused about the material because of the digital or
video format. Confusion over the methods used to convey the information runs
the risk of distorting the substance of the warnings.
To imagine a worst-case scenario, consider a suspect who has spent the past
decades incarcerated without access to new technological developments such as
touch screens, interactive learning programs, or even tablet computers. Brought
to the police station and expecting the traditional Miranda colloquy, instead he
is handed an iPad or tablet and told to complete the program. One can imagine
that the experience would be both completely disempowering and confusing.
The suspect may spend so much time trying to sort through the computer
program that she fails to focus on the information being provided. The data
collection measures that collect information about confusion, time to complete
the program, etc., would register delay and problems. Yet, the source of that
confusion may not be the substance of Miranda, but the digital delivery
mechanism of the App.
Similarly, vulnerable suspects—for example, the intellectually disabled,
mentally ill, juveniles, or others with health impairments—may become
overwhelmed with the digital interface and thus be unable to appreciate the
information. Interactive videos, hyperlinks, and testing will all present
additional barriers for comprehension. While the current Miranda process does
a poor job of ensuring that vulnerable suspects understand the Miranda
warnings,271 at least the confusion centers on the substance, not the delivery
mechanism. A Miranda App could, in fact, increase comprehension problems if
designed poorly.
Three arguments respond to this legitimate criticism of the Miranda App.
First, the Miranda App would be a choice, not a requirement. For particular
suspects who are uncomfortable with technology or disabled in some manner,
the traditional Miranda process would always be available. In fact, if a suspect
should become confused, or need human explanation, or wish to opt out of the
Miranda App completely, she can always request human police assistance and
proceed in the traditional manner. Second, more and more people are becoming
comfortable with this type of learning medium. Four year-olds can now scroll
through an iPad and complete educational games without much assistance.272
Elementary schools incorporate digital media classes and teach basic computer
skills as part of the formal curriculum.273 Almost three-quarters of Americans
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See supra Part I.
Interview with Alexa Ann Ferguson, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 3, 2016) (“Daddy,
leave me alone, I can do this game myself.”).
273 See, e.g., Kate Hayden, Learning by Screenlight in the 21st Century, CHARLES CITY
PRESS (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.charlescitypress.com/site/epopulate/2015/12/09/learningby-screenlight-in-the-21st-century/ [https://perma.cc/P2AC-JVPY] (discussing a digital
citizenship curriculum for elementary schools); Andy Smith, URI’s Renee Hobbs Champions
272
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own a smartphone with digital learning capabilities.274 Almost ninety percent of
Americans use the Internet.275 This comfort with digital information and
learning will only increase over time. Third, while technology may compound
confusion for vulnerable suspects, it may also flag that confusion for further
investigation. In the traditional practice, vulnerable suspects can mask confusion
or ignorance without much awareness from interrogating officers. Despite
documented developmental disabilities or mental illness, in many confession
cases, the interrogating police officers failed to see the suspect’s comprehension
issues.276 With a Miranda App, the suspect’s struggle to use the technology will
create a signal that perhaps something is amiss with the suspect’s ability to
process the relevant information. While not determinative, it might cause police
to redouble their efforts to ensure that the suspect does understand the issues or
to investigate the developmental barriers at issue.
As a final point, the design elements of the Miranda App will need to be
conscious of the potential off-putting nature of technology. Technology can be
distancing, but it can also be immersive. Designing the program with a
sensitivity to creating a welcoming environment will be key to the App’s
success.
2. Digital Fatigue
On the opposite side of the technological spectrum, some sophisticated digital
users may be so accustomed to digital prompts and virtual agreements that they
ignore the serious nature of the process. Almost everyone with a smartphone or
computer routinely clicks “agree” to online terms of service which they have not
read.277 User agreements regularly involve contracts in which the agreeing party
agrees with no actual knowledge of the agreement.278 Online training programs
Digital
Literacy,
PROVIDENCE
J.
(Nov.
23,
2013),
http://www.providencejournal.com/topics/special-reports/ewave/content/20131123-urisrenee-hobbs-champions-digital-literacy.ece [https://perma.cc/FZY8-S3PM] (describing the
introduction of digital literacy in Rhode Island schools); Andrew Wyrich, In Emerson, an
Early Lesson in “Digital Citizenship” and Online Presence, N. JERSEY (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://archive.northjersey.com/news/education/lessons-in-online-citizenship-begin-early1.1272258?page=all [https://perma.cc/L8VG-6JMB].
274 JACOB POUSHTER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP AND INTERNET
USAGE CONTINUES TO CLIMB IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: BUT ADVANCED ECONOMIES STILL
HAVE HIGHER RATES OF TECHNOLOGY USE 3 (2016).
275 Id. at 11.
276 See Ferguson, supra note 163, at 1461.
277 See generally Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2014).
278 Amy Kristin Sanders & Patrick C. File, Giving Users a Plain Deal: Contract-Related
Media Liability for Unmasking Anonymous Commenters, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 197, 205-06
(2011) (“Despite the adhesive nature of these contracts, many courts have ruled that clickwrap
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required for employment often can be completed without full understanding.
Many of our digital tests can be passed with minimal understanding and less
than serious consideration. We have learned not to resist a “clickwrap” culture.
This can be especially troubling in the case of vulnerable suspects who do not
understand the substance or cannot process the volume of information required
to agree or disagree with the terms of service. But, it also negatively impacts
sophisticated parties inured to the meaning of these digital agreements.
Digital fatigue—here, meaning not having the energy or capacity to engage
an overload of digital information—can be combated by two design elements.
First, the Miranda App should signal to the user the importance of the Miranda
moment. This can be done in the introduction or the first few minutes. While
many digitally savvy users have become largely dismissive of online tests or
programs, this particular one does have life-changing consequences. As such,
even jaded technology users may pay attention if so instructed in clear enough
language. Second, for vulnerable suspects, the system will need to be designed
to catch individuals just trying to pass through the program without
understanding the process. Design elements that require consistent answers,
answers in one’s own words, or force suspects to confirm their understanding
may assist in catching those suspects who are simply pretending to understand.
3. Validation
A Miranda App should be tested by social scientists interested in Miranda
comprehension. Just as academic researchers have tested Miranda
comprehension on prisoners, college students, and volunteers, so should a
Miranda App be tested for validation. Once designed, testing a Miranda App
should not be difficult. All that is needed is a source of representative volunteers.
But testing should be required to ensure that the message, medium, and
mechanisms of data collection work as designed. Obviously, a Miranda App
could be rolled out for real world use, and the testing could take place with real
suspects, with the data collected and analyzed as appropriate. However, the
better course would be to test, validate, and perhaps edit or correct the design in
a laboratory setting before offering it to detectives involved in active criminal
investigations.
While time-consuming on the front end, this validation and testing process
will help with large-scale adoption. Policing is a tradition-bound and ruleoriented profession. Confessions will be litigated by zealous defense lawyers.
So, all new technology used in criminal cases will need to withstand legal
challenge. For this reason, ensuring through rigorous testing that the Miranda
App works to educate suspects will also allow the program to withstand these
types of legal attacks. Only after police, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and courts

and other online user agreements are contractually enforceable, analogizing the user’s
clicking on ‘I agree’ to the traditional signing on the dotted line. In essence, these courts view
the click as manifesting an objective intent to contract.”).
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all accept the value of the program will it become a routine part of interrogation
practice.
4. Legal Interpretation
A related challenge involves how the technology will be interpreted in court.
The goal in creating a well-designed, validated, and helpful Miranda App would
be to avoid costly litigation about the adequacy of Miranda waivers. The
traditional practice of litigating a detective’s distortion of Miranda or a suspect’s
inability to comprehend Miranda or some other deficiency involves significant
time and expense. A Miranda App would provide a default mechanism to avoid
the case-by-case evaluation of the adequacy of warning and waiver. If a suspect
used the Miranda App and successfully went through the program, courts could
create a presumption of understanding that would satisfy the constitutional
threshold.
Despite the presumption, there will be cases when the Miranda App is
challenged in court. Here, the technology’s advantage to resolve disputes about
a suspect’s understanding will become evident. In the traditional practice, the
Miranda hearing usually involves a police detective explaining that he provided
the Miranda warnings as required and that the suspect appeared to understand
them. In opposition, the defense (either through the suspect or an expert) will
assert that while the rights were given, they were not adequately understood.
Then, a judge, based on a battle of experts, will be required to address the waiver
issue. Because neither the detective nor the suspect would have been concerned
with creating a detailed record of the suspect’s understanding during the
interrogation, most of the judge’s determinations would necessarily be inferred
from testimony, expert reports, or observation (in the case of videotaped
confessions). The judge will be relying on a record created after the fact, and
sometimes months or years after the fact of the interrogation.
In contrast, with a Miranda App a record of how the suspect processed the
information would have been developed at the time it happened. Information
about confusion, clarification, or misunderstandings of language, context, or
concepts would be apparent in the data. Granular clues about comprehension
problems would be documented. Experts could study the real-time experience
of a suspect, rather than trying to recreate it after the fact. While still requiring
some court time to litigate, the areas of contention would be cabined, and the
record more clearly established. This would reduce cost and time, and while not
a complete escape from pretrial litigation, it would offer judges a better factual
record from which to decide cases.
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5. Security
The Miranda App, because it will include protected personal information, will
need to be designed conscious of security and privacy concerns.279 Personal
information will need to be encrypted, secured, and retained. The video stream
of the individual using the App will need to be kept private. The data will need
to be secured from external interference.280 After the fact, police should not be
able to get unrestricted access to the material in the App that will become the
subject of the criminal case.281 Data files that will accompany criminal
prosecutions will need to be tracked and collected for prosecutors and defense
lawyers to use in court.282
Use of a Miranda App across jurisdictions will require local and national
collection systems to be created to securely store the data. With millions of
interrogations and millions of Miranda waivers, these collection points will
require their own security systems and protocols. Difficult questions will emerge
about retention policies, as criminal cases can take many years to come to
completion. In addition, cost issues will arise as the storage of this data will be
expensive and hard to manage. Especially, if this information will eventually be
made available to researchers to study Miranda, a system must be created to
anonymize the personal data. As a technical challenge, the Miranda App will
need to both be able to identify individual suspects using unique identifiers and
also be able anonymize the data for research purposes. The Miranda App will,
thus, need local and national systems in place to ensure the integrity of the data
useful for court as well as mechanisms to save and search the data for later
academic use.

279

See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV.
385, 387-88 (2013) (discussing privacy by design through “back end” concerns, “such as data
security through encryption, data minimization techniques, anonymity, and structural
protection though organizational prioritization of privacy” and “front end” concerns “such as
privacy settings, search visibility, password protections, and the ability to use pseudonyms”).
280 Measures to protect data security will need to be implemented to mirror existing
protections of other police data. See, e.g., Robert Abel, NYPD Officer Arrested for Hacking
FBI Databases, SC MAG. (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.scmagazine.com/nypd-officer-hackeddatabases-to-get-info-on-accident-victims/article/404250/
[https://perma.cc/45UL-ACE6]
(describing a police officer who was arrested for hacking into a police computer to obtain
information about individuals); Paul Suarez, AntiSec Hackers Steal, Post Police Data,
(Aug.
6,
2011,
1:31
PM),
PCWORLD
http://www.pcworld.com/article/237459/antisec_hackers_steal_post_police_data.html
[https://perma.cc/X9ZS-7D25] (describing hackers’ theft and release of data from police
agencies).
281 Access should likely be controlled by the prosecutor’s office handing the criminal case.
282 Suspect-relevant information will need to be provided to defense counsel in any case
in which the Miranda App is used and a resulting confession is obtained.
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CONCLUSION
The essays in this Symposium issue cover many themes, including:
reflections on the pre-history, history, and evolution of Miranda doctrine;283 the
real and alleged failures of Miranda in theory and practice;284 and the possibility
of achieving Miranda’s original promise, both in the United States as well as
abroad,285 through future tinkering and reform.286 These articles have also
analyzed Miranda as part of a more systemic and contextual understanding of
constitutional criminal procedure in the American adversarial system.287
Our call for a Miranda App fits with many of these themes and concerns. As
many scholars have argued, lamented, and documented over the years, Miranda
has largely failed in the last five decades to achieve its core mission of reducing
custodial pressure and compulsion while eliciting genuinely voluntary and
knowing consent to police interrogation.288 One way of telling the history of
Miranda is through an analysis of the evolution of its various component parts—
custody, interrogation, the warning and waiver ritual, invocation, voluntariness,
constitutional understanding, and Miranda’s many exceptions—which we have
done in these pages. Yet, we seek in this Article not to mourn Miranda’s failures
so much as to find a new way to achieve Miranda’s core values and concerns as
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articulated in the original Miranda opinion and also in recent progeny. In
removing arguably the core problem with Miranda in practice—police control
over the administration of Miranda warnings and the elicitation of Miranda
waivers and non-waivers—we can improve the practice of Miranda by bringing
it into the digital age.
Our approach to Miranda in this Article is a conservative one. We seek to
preserve—rather than to expand or cut back on—Miranda’s core constitutional
principles and values. Our position also reflects a compromise. Our advocacy
for a Miranda App is neither pro-defendant nor pro-prosecution. The purpose of
a Miranda App is not to increase or decrease Miranda waivers or invocations;
nor is it to increase or decrease confession or conviction rates. The purpose of a
Miranda App is to improve constitutional practice, process, understanding, and
fairness. We take no position on whether the Miranda App should advance law
enforcement goals. We suspect that, like Miranda itself, American police will
successfully adapt to the use of the Miranda App and benefit, at the very least,
from the greater legitimacy it will confer on their interrogation practices and the
confession statements they obtain.
While our recommendation of a Miranda App offers a substantial
improvement over existing practices, it is far from perfect. Even with the
adoption of a Miranda App, there will still be much to learn, as well as to
improve in successive iterations of a Miranda App prototype. We believe that
the best way to achieve the full potential of a Miranda App would be to invite a
future project of design, which would include not only technology engineers,
designers, and experts, but also police, prosecutors, public defenders, former
defendants, and law professors. Given the seemingly limitless advances of
technology in almost every aspect of American life in the last decade, it now
seems inevitable that Miranda’s future years will be influenced, at least to some
extent, by technologies like the Miranda App that this Article proposes. This
new technology offers a way forward out of the current Miranda morass that
was not thinkable even a mere ten years ago—a way forward that will hopefully
allow us to create and implement a better version of Miranda for the next fifty
years.

